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A RIGHT TO GO DARK (?)
David Gray
ABSTRACT
In 2013, reports based on documents leaked by former National Security
Agency contractor Edward Snowden revealed committed efforts by federal
agencies to develop and deploy data surveillance technologies. These reve-
lations documented the ability of government agencies to monitor internet
usage, read the contents of communications, and access data stored in the
cloud and on personal devices. These revelations marked a turning point in
the public conversation as consumers became aware of the extent to which
national security and law enforcement agencies can monitor a wide range
of activities in physical and virtual spaces.
The market responded. Technology companies began to tout their com-
mitments to privacy. Some waged quixotic battles to resist government re-
quests for user information. Others deployed and promoted privacy-
protective technologies. Google began encrypting data flows between their
servers. Encrypted email and messaging services entered the mainstream.
Hardware companies made encryption a standard feature on computers
and mobile devices. As this new movement to “go dark” took hold, gov-
ernment officials, including then-Director of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) James Comey, went on the attack, arguing that encryption
would hamstring law enforcement and threaten national security.
These issues came to a head in 2016 when the FBI sought access to an
Apple iPhone recovered from the perpetrators of a December 2015 terror-
ist attack in San Bernardino, California. The FBI had a warrant to search
the phone but could not serve that warrant because the phone was en-
crypted, and the sole possessor of the password was dead. The FBI sought
the assistance of Apple to circumnavigate the phone’s encryption. Apple
refused and later contested a court order compelling the company to
decrypt the phone. In addition to its own rights, Apple and its amici sug-
gested that forcing a technology company to compromise encryption would
threaten the rights of customers. The FBI eventually dropped the suit, but
debates about a right to “go dark” persist, stoked by continuing complaints
by government agencies and legislative proposals to limit the availability of
robust encryption.
Debates about privacy and technology tend toward grand abstractions.
This article takes a different tack by focusing on three potential doctrinal
grounds for such a right: the Fourth Amendment, which governs searches
and seizures; the Fifth Amendment, which bars compelled testimonial in-
crimination; and evidentiary rules on privilege, which sometimes protect
information sharing between some parties. It concludes that shifts in the
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law and the new ways we interact with technologies point to an emergent
right to go dark.
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I. INTRODUCTION
ON December 2, 2015, environmental engineer Syed RizwanFarook was attending a training event and holiday party at theInland Regional Center with fellow employees of the San Ber-
nardino, California Health Department.1 At some point, Farook left the
event, perhaps after a dispute with coworkers, but soon returned in the
company of his wife Tashfeen Malik.2 The couple had armed themselves
with assault rifles, handguns, and pipe bombs.3 They opened fire, killing
fourteen people and wounding nearly two dozen more.4 Then they fled
the building, leaving behind a cluster of pipe bombs attached to a remote
trigger, which blessedly never detonated.5
Law enforcement quickly identified Farook and Malik as the perpetra-
tors. Later that day, the two were spotted driving in their sports utility
vehicle.6 A pursuit ensued. When officers succeeded in stopping and sur-
rounding their vehicle, Farook and Malik again opened fire, wounding
several officers on the scene.7 Officers returned fire.8 Both Farook and
Malik were killed.9 A search of their car turned up guns, bombs, and
thousands of rounds of ammunition. As Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) official David Bowdich would later put it, “[T]here was obviously a
mission here.”10
1. Adam Nagourney et al., San Bernardino Shooting Kills at Least 14; Two Suspects





5. Report Sheds Light on Chaos, Bloodshed of San Bernadino Terror Attack, CBS
NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/report-sheds-light-on-chaos-bloodshed-of-san-ber





10. Doug Smith, Federal Agents Investigating Possible Terrorism Link in San Bernar-
dino Mass Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-fbi-probe-terror-link-san-bernardino-shooting-20151203-story.html [https://perma
.cc/H2TF-AA27].
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But what was that mission? Was it an act of revenge for workplace
slights, real or imagined? Was the motive more sinister and far-reaching?
Both Farook and Malik were Muslim, so some immediately suspected ter-
rorism. But Farook was born in Illinois.11 Malik was born in Pakistan but
had immigrated legally.12 She had also recently given birth to the couple’s
first child.13 By outward appearances, they did not seem to be zealots or
extremists. They had no known ties to terrorist groups. To the contrary,
they appeared by all outward measures to live a comfortable middle-class
life. But if not terrorism, then what could be the motive for their “mis-
sion”? And if this was an act of terrorism, then were they acting on their
own or were they part of a network? Were more attacks coming? When?
Where? Why? How? Who?
As these and other questions swirled in the hours and days after the
attack, investigators identified a source of potentially valuable informa-
tion: an iPhone 5C Farook carried for his work.14 Armed with a warrant,
officers obtained some information from Apple servers where back-up
copies of some data from the phone were stored.15 Unfortunately, those
back-up copies were neither current nor complete.16 Investigators needed
to access the device, but it was running a recent update to Apple’s iOS
operating system, which meant that most of the data that would have
been interesting to investigators, including contacts, mails, text messages,
and photographs, were encrypted and out of reach without the passcode
Farook had taken to his grave.17 The software provided additional secur-
ity, limiting the number of times agents could experiment with possible
passcodes without risking permanent loss of the data.18
Stymied, officers asked Apple for assistance in decrypting the phone.19
Apple declined.20 Agents then sought and received an order from Magis-
trate Judge Sheri Pym compelling Apple to provide “reasonable technical
assistance” to agents seeking to conduct a warranted search of the
phone.21 Apple again objected, this time taking its protest public.22 In





14. See Declaration of Christopher Pluhar at 1–3, In re An Apple iPhone Seized Dur-
ing the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-0451M (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3–5.
17. See id. at 2–3.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Gov’t’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search at 1–4, In re An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on
a Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
20. Id.
21. Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search at *1–2, In re An Apple
iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. ED 15-0451M).
22. See, e.g., Sarah Parvini & Matt Hamilton, Apple vs. FBI: Protestors Gather at the
Grove in Support of Tech Giant’s Defiance, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.la
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doing so, it brought the San Bernardino investigation into the middle of a
debate between law enforcement and technology companies that had
been brewing for years.23
In 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward
Snowden leaked more than a million top secret files to Glenn Greenwald
and Laura Poitras of the Guardian.24 Greenwald and Poitras began re-
porting on some of the programs revealed in these files in June 2013,
revealing a broad-based effort by federal law enforcement and national
security agencies to gather, access, store, and analyze a wide range of
data, sometimes with the cooperation of technology companies and
sometimes by more direct means, including hacking.25 The Snowden rev-
elations sparked broad public conversations about government surveil-
lance, leading to some modest legislative and executive reforms. But, in
June 2013, government investigators were concerned with Snowden him-
self. As part of their investigation, government agents sought access to an
email account associated with Snowden and hosted by Lavabit.26
In 2013, Lavabit was at the vanguard of the movement to provide con-
sumers with secure communications and data storage. Among its prod-
ucts was an email service boasting asymmetric encryption.27 Agents
served Lavabit with a court order and then a warrant seeking disclosure
of the SSL keys to its encrypted email service.28 Although Lavabit had in
the past complied with search warrants for the contents of some of its
users’ accounts,29 it refused to turn over its SSL keys to law enforcement
because doing so would have compromised the privacy and data security
of all its clients.30 Faced with increasing pressure from the government
and bound by a court-issued gag order, Lavabit ceased operations.31 Soon
after, a company called Silent Circle, which also provided encrypted com-
times.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-apple-fbi-protesters-support-apple-defiance-20160223-
story.html [https://perma.cc/Q94Z-NFA6].
23. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Dru Brenner-Beck, “Going Dark”: Encryption, Privacy,
Liberty, and Security in the “Golden Age of Surveillance,” in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 330, 363–68 (David Gray & Stephen Henderson eds., 2017) (re-
counting the history of encryption debates going back to the Clipper chip controversy in
the 1990s).
24. Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden: How the Spy Story of the Age Leaked Out,
GUARDIAN (June 12, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/11/edward-
snowden-nsa-whistleblower-profile [https://perma.cc/H6M9-BLN8].
25. See id.
26. Dominic Rushe, Lavabit Founder Refused FBI Order to Hand Over Email Encryp-
tion Keys, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/03/
lavabit-ladar-levison-fbi-encryption-keys-snowden [https://perma.cc/U4FV-BN49].
27. Michael Phillips, How the Government Killed a Secure E-Mail Company, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/how-the-
government-killed-a-secure-e-mail-company [https://perma.cc/UB4T-EMAX].
28. See id.
29. See generally, e.g., Bowman v. United States, 2017 WL 3594665 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
21, 2017) (No. 5:16CV162) (documenting Lavabit’s compliance with a warrant for account
information).
30. See Phillips, supra note 27.
31. Ledar Levison, Secrets, Lies & Snowden’s Email: Why I Was Forced to Shut Down
Lavabit, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
may/20/why-did-lavabit-shut-down-snowden-email [https://perma.cc/9DPL-25DN].
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munications services, closed its doors, citing worries that it could no
longer guarantee the security of its products against court-backed efforts
by government agents to gain access.32
Threats of legal pressure from government investigators forced Lavabit
and Silent Circle to shutter their businesses, but the market for secure
electronic communications, internet access, and data storage exploded in
the weeks and months after the initial Snowden revelations.33 That de-
mand grew as citizens and consumers continued to learn about the extent
of surveillance efforts by both government and private actors. At the
same time, major technology firms like Google, Yahoo, and Apple faced
public criticism on grounds that they had failed to protect their customers
from government prying.34 By 2014, many major technology players had
responded by offering more robust encryption as an option on many of
their devices, as well as encrypted communication and data storage plat-
forms.35 In September 2014, Apple went a step further, introducing de-
fault encryption as a feature of iOS 8.36 Apple even claimed not to have
or to keep encryption keys, crowing that, “[u]nlike our competitors, Ap-
ple cannot bypass your passcode, and therefore cannot access [encrypted]
data.”37 Only users, armed with passcodes they selected, could decrypt
their devices. IOS 8 converted consumer devices into unbreakable data
lockboxes that could be accessed only with the cooperation of their users.
Everyday consumers now had the ability to “go dark.”
High-profile law enforcement and national security officials immedi-
ately criticized Apple for offering lock-down encryption on its devices.
Then-Attorney General Eric Holder warned that, “[w]hen a child is in
danger, law enforcement needs to be able to take every legally available
step to quickly find and protect the child and to stop those [who] abuse
children.”38 He continued, “It is worrisome to see companies thwarting
32. Parmy Olson, Encryption App Silent Circle Shuts Down E-Mail Service ‘To Pre-
vent Spying’, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2013/08/09/
encryption-app-silent-circle-shuts-down-e-mail-service-to-prevent-spying/#4fa7a28e6376
[https://perma.cc/5H4K-XTM6].
33. A.W. Geiger, How Americans Have Viewed Government Surveillance and Privacy
Since Snowden Leaks, FACT TANK (June 4, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2018/06/04/how-americans-have-viewed-government-surveillance-and-privacy-since-snow
den-leaks/ [https://perma.cc/4XQY-NJZM].
34. Micah Lee, Apple Still Has Plenty of Your Data for the Feds, INTERCEPT (Sept. 22,
2014), https://theintercept.com/2014/09/22/apple-data/ [https://perma.cc/FG7A-4XSW].
35. Steve Henn, How Well Do Tech Companies Protect Your Data from Snooping?,
NPR (June 12, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/06/12/
320997037/how-well-do-tech-companies-protect-your-data-from-snooping [https://perma
.cc/3VCF-4H3L].
36. Matthew Green, Is Apple Picking a Fight with the U.S. Government?, SLATE (Sept.
23, 2014), https://slate.com/technology/2014/09/ios-8-encryption-why-apple-wont-unlock-
your-iphone-for-the-police.html [https://perma.cc/TW9R-LXGP].
37. David E. Sanger & Brian X. Chen, Signaling Post-Snowden Era, New iPhone
Locks out N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/techno
logy/iphone-locks-out-the-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html [https://perma.cc/RL54-
ZPGJ].
38. Kif Leswing, Apple and the FBI Are in the Middle of a Huge Battle That Could
Affect the Privacy of Millions of People—Here’s Everything That’s Happened So Far, BUS.
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our ability to do so.”39 Then-Director of the FBI James Comey charged
that data encryption and encrypted communications platforms would
compromise law enforcement and national security efforts.40 The Chief of
Detectives for the Chicago Police Department predicted that “Apple will
become the phone of choice for the pedophile.”41
These dire predictions seemed to prove out when agents found them-
selves locked out of Syed Farook’s iPhone. Here were law enforcement
officers in the midst of an urgent investigation with lives potentially in the
balance. They had abided the most demanding Fourth Amendment stan-
dards, presenting their case to a federal judge and securing a probable
cause warrant granting them access to the contents of the phone. But they
could not exercise their lawful authority to search the phone because Ap-
ple had chosen to embed robust encryption in their operating system. Did
Farook have a right to go dark? Did Apple have the right, as then-Attor-
ney General Loretta Lynch asked, to make that decision for all of us
about when and in what circumstances citizens and corporations can
thwart legitimate law enforcement and national security operations?42
The near universal response on the part of government officials was
“no.”43 Legislators began suggesting that companies should be required
to maintain keys to their encrypted products in order to guarantee the
ability of government agents to lawfully access data and devices through
“backdoors.”44 Judge Pym issued an order under the All Writs Act com-
INSIDER (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/fbi-vs-apple-history-of-apples-
fight-over-the-locked-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone [https://perma.cc/HG6Y-2JTE].
39. Id.
40. Don Reisinger, Former National Security Officials Support Encryption, FORTUNE
(Dec. 16, 2015), https://fortune.com/2015/12/16/national-security-encryption/ [https://perma
.cc/G82K-NYJS].
41. Craig Timberg & Greg Miller, FBI Blasts Apple, Google for Locking Police Out of
Phones, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technolo
gy/2014/09/25/68c4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html?utm_term=.deb4b6708d
9c [https://perma.cc/T6FF-5DVX].
42. Thomas Brewster, Loretta Lynch Says Americans Back DoJ in Fight to Unlock
Apple’s iPhones, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/
2016/03/01/iphone-backdoors-loretta-lynch/#368c02dd1510 [https://perma.cc/U256-QMP7].
43. The exception here is General Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA and
the Central Intelligence Agency. In the middle of the encryption controversy after San
Bernardino, he took the position that everyone should have the right to deploy and use
robust encryption but that the intelligence agencies would have a reciprocal right to de-
velop and deploy decryption tools and then it would be “game on” for the NSA to break it.
See Michael Hayden: America Is Safer with End-to-End Encryption, NPR (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2016/03/01/michael-hayden-nsa-encryption [https://perma.cc/
6QW8-PF65]; Jose Pagliery, Ex-NSA Boss Says FBI Director Is Wrong on Encryption,
CNN (Jan. 13, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/01/13/technology/nsa-michael-hayden-
encryption/index.html [https://perma.cc/GKX9-KXLJ].
44. That push for legislation granting law enforcement and intelligence agencies access
to encrypted data ended when Congress failed to pass the Compliance with Court Orders
Act of 2016. See Andy Greenberg, The Senate’s Draft Encryption Bill Is ‘Ludicrous, Dan-
gerous, Technically Illiterate’, WIRED (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/sen
ates-draft-encryption-bill-privacy-nightmare/ [https://perma.cc/7PTD-WMWE]. The effort
was revived recently when FBI Director Christopher Wray suggested that law enforcement
officers have been unable to access 7,800 devices because of encryption. See Morgan Chal-
fant, New Push to Break Deadlock Over Encrypted Phones, HILL (Apr. 8, 2018), https://the
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pelling Apple to create an access point into Farook’s phone by develop-
ing technology capable of circumnavigating the encryption on his
iPhone.45 Apple resisted, relying in part on its own First Amendment
rights.46 Technology companies, civil libertarians, academics, and others
jumped to Apple’s defense, arguing that limiting the ability of companies
to develop and deploy encryption technologies would compromise pri-
vacy interests, render a whole range of sensitive information vulnerable,
threaten First Amendment rights to association and freedom of the press,
expose political activists in repressive regimes to threats of death, and
impede technological development.47
The Apple encryption controversy raised important questions of con-
stitutional rights and public policy that ultimately went unanswered. The
FBI identified a private contractor who was able to unlock Farook’s
iPhone, effectively mooting the case.48 But the going dark debate has
continued to simmer.49 Legislation compelling the installation of
backdoors has been introduced here and in other western democracies.50
Law enforcement agents have continued to criticize technology compa-
hill.com/policy/cybersecurity/382048-new-push-to-break-deadlock-over-encrypted-phones
[https://perma.cc/HAQ3-LVE3]. The Senate Judiciary Committee has also been working
with technology industry players to find a means to grant law enforcement access to en-
crypted data. Id.
45. Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, supra note 21, at *1–4.
46. Apple Inc’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Assistance at 32–34, In re An Apple
iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. ED
15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Apple Inc’s Motion to Vacate Order].
47. Among the organizations and groups filing briefs in the case were: Access Now
and Wickr Foundation; ACLU of Southern California; ACT, the App Association; Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation and Technologists, Researchers, and Cryptographers; Privacy
International and Human Rights Watch; Airbnb, Inc.; Atlassion Pty. Ltd.; Automattic Inc.;
CloudFlare, Inc.; eBay Inc.; GitHub, Inc.; Meetup, Inc.; reddit, Inc.; Square Inc.;
Squarespace, Inc.; Twilio Inc.; Twitter, Inc.; and Wickr Inc.; AT&T Mobility LLC; Intel
Corporation; Amazon.com, Box, Cisco Systems, Dropbox, Evernote, Facebook, Google,
Microsoft, Mozilla, Nest, Pinterest, Slack, Snapchat, WhatsApp, and Yahoo; AVG Technol-
ogies, The Computer & Communications Industry Association, Data Foundry, Golden
Frog, The Internet Associations and the Internet Infrastructure Coalition; The Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC); BSA, The Software Alliance, the Consumer Technol-
ogy Association, the Information Technology Industry Council, and Tech Net; Center for
Democracy and Technology; The Media Institute; Non Party Law Professors; iPhone Se-
curity and Applied Cryptography Experts Dino Dai Zovi et al.; Richard Taub; and Lavabit
LLC.
48. See Samantha Masunaga, FBI Doesn’t Have to Say Who Unlocked San Bernadino
Shooter’s iPhone, Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/busi
ness/la-fi-tn-fbi-iphone-20171002-story.html [https://perma.cc/JF6T-RMTZ].
49. See Corn & Brenner-Beck, supra note 23, at 333–38 (recounting the modern “go-
ing dark” debate).
50. Compare Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and
Access) Act Bill 2018 (Cth) (Austl.) (enabling law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
compel access to encrypted communications), with Verordnung u¨ber die technische und
organisatorische Umsetzung von Maßnahmen zur U¨berwachung der Telekommunikation
[TKU¨V] [Telecommunications Monitoring Order], Mar. 11, 2005, BGBL at 3136 (Ger.)
(requiring that telecommunication service providers be able to surveil communications),
and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, 2 c. 25, § 253 (Gr. Brit.) (permitting the Secretary
of State to serve notice on telecommunication providers of a requirement to technical as-
sistance), and the proposed American legislation discussed supra note 44.
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nies for developing and installing encryption in their products.51 And
technology companies have continued to assert their purported rights to
develop and deploy encryption and other technologies that enhance the
ability of users to go dark.52 Lavabit has even reopened its doors, offering
a new suite of products offering secure communication and data stor-
age.53 Amidst all of this conversation and activity, the privacy interests of
citizens and consumers have been part of the conversation, but there has
been shockingly little effort to explain whether and how those privacy
interests might support a right to go dark. This article aims to fill that gap.
Do we have the right to go dark? It is a question that grows more
important as digital communications, data storage, smart devices, and in-
ternet connected products ranging from phones to refrigerators become
increasingly central to our lives. Take, as an example, personal devices
like smartphones and wearable fitness trackers. These devices can and
must gather intimate information in order to provide services and user
benefits. Many devices also gather a range of rather quotidian informa-
tion that, when aggregated and analyzed, can be quite revealing.54 It is
therefore natural to consider much of the information these devices
gather to be private.55 But that does not answer the going dark question.
Information can be private but still accessible to government agents
through lawful means, such as warranted searches.56 To ask whether citi-
zens and consumers have a right to go dark is, therefore, to ask whether
they have a right to act as the sole conduits to their data by deploying
technological means that guarantee absolute immunity from government
intrusion and information gathering without their cooperation.
51. Then-Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein accused tech companies of being
unwilling to develop “responsible encryption” and asserted that the public will bear the
cost of law enforcement’s inability to access encrypted data. See Sari Horwitz, Justice Dept.
Might More Aggressively Seek Encrypted Data from Tech Companies, WASH. POST (Oct.
10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-might-
more-aggressively-seek-encrypted-data-from-tech-companies/2017/10/10/f33a91fc-adf7-
11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html [https://perma.cc/53WD-ZM2D]. In Florida, Polk
County Sheriff Grady Judd threatened to arrest Apple CEO Tim Cook if his agency was
unable to execute a warrant for encrypted data. Seung Lee, Apple’s CEO Hears It from a
Florida Sheriff, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 12, 2016), https://www.newsweek.com/apple-ceo-hears-
it-florida-sheriff-436306 [https://perma.cc/5G9E-QCHC].
52. Cook has defended data encryption as the only way to protect privacy and reaf-
firmed the right to keep data encrypted. Apple CEO Tim Cook Talks Importance of En-
cryption, MSNBC (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/watch/apple-ceo-tim-
cook-talks-importance-of-encryption-1204842563515 [https://perma.cc/36A3-4UAF]. Tech
giants Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook have been urging Australian lawmakers to
reconsider a law requiring tech companies to assist in decrypting data. Apple and Facebook
Among Tech Firms Lobbying Against Australia’s Encrypted Data Law, CNBC (Oct. 3,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/03/tech-giants-allied-against-proposed-australia-law-
seeking-encrypted-data.html [https://perma.cc/4KTA-QX6S].
53. LAVABIT, https://lavabit.com/ [https://perma.cc/34W8-VB8H] (last visited Oct. 12,
2019).
54. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–22 (2018); United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); United States v. Maynard, 615
F.3d 544, 558–59 (2010).
55. Carpenter, 128 S. Ct. at 2217; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
56. Carpenter, 128 S. Ct. at 2222–23; Riley, 573 U.S. at 401.
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Debates about privacy and technology tend toward grand abstractions.
This article takes a different tack by focusing on the three most salient
sources of legal limits on the ability of law enforcement and other govern-
ment agents to access and gather information: the Fourth Amendment,
the Fifth Amendment prohibition on compelled witnessing, and eviden-
tiary privileges. It concludes that, although present doctrine probably
does not support a general right to go dark, that may well change as tech-
nologies continue to play more central roles in our lives and government
agencies continue to deploy and use technologies capable of facilitating
programs of broad and pervasive surveillance.
II. A FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO GO DARK (?)
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.57
The threshold question in any Fourth Amendment case is whether gov-
ernment conduct constitutes a “search.”58 If government conduct is a
“search,” then it falls within the regulatory purview of the Fourth
Amendment. If not, then government agents may act at their discretion,
free from Fourth Amendment restraints.59 One might assume that deter-
mining whether government action constitutes a “search” is a fairly
straight-forward task. We all know what it is to “search.” Any “seeking,”
“looking into,” or “looking through,” in order “to find or discover some-
thing” would qualify.60 I search for my keys before leaving the house; I
search for a friend in a crowded restaurant; and I search for information
on the internet about a political candidate. Not complicated. But, in its
vast, and perhaps well-intentioned, wisdom, the Supreme Court has made
the task rather more complicated.
It all started with Olmstead v. United States, decided in 1928.61 There,
prohibition agents suspected that Roy Olmstead—of all things a former
lieutenant in the Seattle police force—was engaged in a conspiracy to
import and distribute illegal liquor in violation of the Volstead Act.62 In
an effort to look for information and to seek evidence of Olmstead’s ille-
gal activities, federal agents installed a wiretapping device on telephone
57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
58. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN
AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 251 (2017).
59. Jones, 565 U.S. at 421–22 (Alito, J., concurring); GRAY, supra note 58, at 253;
David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 67
(2013).
60. GRAY, supra note 58, at 158–60.
61. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
62. Id. at 455–56.
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lines leading into his home.63 The agents found what they sought.64 By
listening to Olmstead’s conversations, the agents were able to document
his participation in the conspiracy and discover when and where his ship-
ments of liquor from Canada would arrive.65
By any common definition, we might describe these activities as a
“search.” By less common definition, the Court did not. Over a spirited
dissent written by Justice Louis Brandeis, Chief Justice William Howard
Taft held for the Court that wiretapping Olmstead’s phone line was not a
search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because it entailed “the
use of the sense of hearing and that only.”66 Moreover, “[t]here was no
entry of the houses o[r] offices of the defendants.”67 Absent some looking
or touching coupled with a physical intrusion of a person, house, paper,
or effect, there was no search.68 Absent a search, the Fourth Amendment
imposed no restraints on the officers’ use of wiretaps to look for informa-
tion and certainly did not require approval by a detached and neutral
magistrate in the form of a warrant supported by probable cause.69
After Olmstead, law enforcement officers were left to their own discre-
tion as to whether, when, and why they would use wiretapping and other
surveillance and eavesdropping technologies. At least with respect to the
Fourth Amendment, they were free to listen in on anyone, anytime, for
good reasons, for bad reasons, or for no reasons at all, so long as they did
not physically intrude into a constitutionally protected area.70
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Court had come to regret
granting that broad license. Relatively rare in 1928, telephones had be-
come ubiquitous by 1967.71 So too had law enforcement agencies, which
grew dramatically in size, number, and scale during and after Prohibi-
63. Id. at 456–57.
64. Id. at 457.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 464. The Chief Justice offered no particular justification for isolating our
aural senses in this way. Presumably, he would have felt differently about officers touching
Olmstead or his property, looking through his papers, smelling the contents of his barrels,
or tasting his liquor (at least three times, just to make sure!). One is left to wonder how he
would describe a police officer’s looking for or trying to find evidence by asking informants
and listening to their answers. Or consider a normal exchange in many houses: “Honey, I’m
searching for my keys. Have you seen them?” It seems perfectly normal to include that
asking as part of the search, but it is ineffective, to say the least, without also listening to
the answer.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 466.
69. Id. at 464.
70. See generally Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (Fourth Amendment regu-
lates installation of eavesdropping devices in a private office); Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505 (1961) (Fourth Amendment regulates use of a listening device pushed
through a party wall until it physically touched a heating duct in the target’s building);
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (trespassory entry into a home to install a listening
device violates the Fourth Amendment); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
(use of “detectaphone” to listen through a party wall is not subject to Fourth Amendment
regulation).
71. Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORD. L. REV. 349, 363 (2009).
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tion.72 By the late 1950’s, law enforcement agencies had also become
much more aggressive, not only in investigating and prosecuting crime,
but in domestic surveillance and intelligence-gathering as well.73 Predict-
ably, political activists and dissidents were among their favorite targets.74
Perhaps the most notorious of these efforts was the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Counter Intelligence Program,75 which infamously
targeted political activists such as Fred Hampton and Martin Luther King
Jr.76 But many state and municipal police forces also had officers and
units dedicated to monitoring and, in some cases, infiltrating political
groups.77
Amidst all of this, wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveil-
lance had become common tools in domestic spying programs, at least in
part because of the license granted by Olmstead.78 As a result, every
American faced the very real prospect that they might be subject to gov-
ernment surveillance for insufficient reasons, for bad reasons, or for no
reasons at all.79 Concerned with the general threat to the right of the
72. GRAY, supra note 58, at 191–95.
73. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. III at 3 (1976).
74. Id. at 4–5.
75. This counterintelligence program was designed to disrupt groups and neutralize
individuals deemed to be threats to domestic security. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 7 (explaining surveillance of Martin Luther King Jr.).
77. The New York City Police Department’s Bureau of Special Services was a secre-
tive division of some fifty detectives who routinely surveilled and kept dossiers on individ-
uals based on their race and political affiliations. Emanuel Perlmutter, Police Intelligence
Unit Watches Racial Activity, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1964, at 19. A successful class action suit
was brought against the Bureau of Special Services and the New York City Police Depart-
ment alleging that the surveillance conducted by the bureau violated constitutional protec-
tions. See generally Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Mass. 1985).
78. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
79. The “Church Committee,” so named after Senator Frank Church, would later de-
scribe the nature of this surveillance threat in vivid terms:
Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government agencies
and to[o] much information has [been] collected. The Government has often
undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political
beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on
behalf of a hostile foreign power. The Government, operating primarily
through secret informants, but also using other intrusive techniques such as
wiretaps, microphone “bugs,” surreptitious mail opening, and break-ins, has
swept in vast amounts of information about the personal lives, views, and
associations of American citizens. Investigations of groups deemed poten-
tially dangerous—and even of groups suspected of associating with poten-
tially dangerous organizations—have continued for decades, despite the fact
that those groups did not engage in unlawful activity. Groups and individuals
have been harassed and disrupted because of their political views and their
lifestyles. Investigations have been based upon vague standards whose
breadth made excessive collection inevitable. Unsavory and vicious tactics
have been employed—including anonymous attempts to break up marriages,
disrupt meetings, ostracize persons from their professions, and provoke tar-
get groups into rivalries that might result in deaths. Intelligence agencies
have served the political and personal objectives of presidents and other high
officials. While the agencies often committed excesses in response to pres-
sure from high officials in the Executive branch and Congress, they also oc-
casionally initiated improper activities and then concealed them from
officials whom they had a duty to inform. Governmental officials—including
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people to be secure against unreasonable searches posed by emerging
eavesdropping and surveillance technologies, the Court elected to
reshape its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. That project took shape in
Katz v. United States, decided in 1967.80
Charles Katz was prominent in bookmaking circles as, among other
things, a college basketball handicapper.81 He conducted much of his in-
terstate bookmaking business using one or another of three public tele-
phone booths located near his apartment on Sunset Boulevard in Los
Angeles, California.82 The FBI got wind of his activities and hit upon an
ingenious plan to look for and try to find evidence against Katz. First, the
agents arranged with the telephone company to disable one of the
phones.83 Then, the agents installed an “electronic ear” listening device
between the remaining two phone booths, which would allow them to
eavesdrop on Katz’s conversations no matter which he chose to use.84
Their ploy was successful. The agents found what they were looking for:
evidence documenting Katz’s participation in illegal sports betting.85
The agents in Katz had clearly done their homework on the Fourth
Amendment. Toeing the lines drawn in Olmstead, they were only using
their senses of hearing; the target for their eavesdropping was a public
telephone booth, which is not a person, house, paper, or effect; and the
listening device was installed outside the booths, so there was no physical
intrusion. Add the fact that they had permission from the owner of the
booth—the telephone company—to install the device, and it is easy to
understand their confidence in the constitutionality of this investigative
tactic. Therefore, it must have been shocking when the Court held that
they had violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to secure a warrant
based on probable cause before installing and using this technology to
eavesdrop on Katz’s conversations.86
Writing for the Court in Katz, Justice Potter Stewart redrew the Fourth
Amendment landscape. Noting long-simmering doubts about the merits
of Olmstead in the Court’s jurisprudence,87 Justice Stewart marked a
clean break holding that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”88 Although he eschewed the idea that the Fourth Amendment
established “a general constitutional ‘right to privacy’” in the sense of a
“right to be let alone by other people,” he nevertheless concluded that
those whose principal duty is to enforce the law—have violated or ignored
the law over long periods of time and have advocated and defended their
right to break the law.
GRAY, supra note 58, at 2–3 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. III at 5 (1976)).
80. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353–54.




84. Id. at 13–14.
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348–49.
86. Id. at 354–56.
87. Id. at 353–54.
88. Id. at 351.
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the Fourth Amendment provides constitutional protections for what a
person reasonably “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessi-
ble to the public.”89
In an influential concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II
pointed out that the Court’s holding offered a new definition of
“search.”90 On this definition, government conduct is a search for pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment, if it violates “an actual (subjective) ex-
pectation of privacy” where that expectation is “one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”91 Applying this definition to the
facts in Katz, Justice Harlan had no reservations in supporting the major-
ity’s holding because the government’s “electronically listening to and re-
cording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth.”92 It was therefore con-
duct regulated by the Fourth Amendment. As to the form of that regula-
tion, the Court held that agents needed to either secure a warrant from a
detached and neutral magistrate based on probable cause before eaves-
dropping on Katz’s conversations or cite constitutionally salient reasons
sufficient to justify their failure to secure a warrant.93
Although Katz seemed progressive at the time, its novel definition of
search has evolved so as to exclude from Fourth Amendment regulation a
whole range of government activities that most English speakers would
readily identify as “searches.”94 For example, the Court has held that we
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
shared with third parties, at least where government agents access that
information through those third parties.95 In elaborating this “third-party
doctrine,” the Court has held that there is no search for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment when government agents look through telephone
calling records,96 look through banking records,97 or try to find informa-
tion by recruiting a confidential informant or undercover officer to infil-
trate a group and surreptitiously record conversations by wearing a
wire.98
The Court has also held that we have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in any information we expose to public view.99 Applying this
89. Id. at 350–51.
90. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 353 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 358–59.
94. GRAY, supra note 58, at 68–69.
95. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–46 (1979); GRAY, supra note 58, at 84–89.
96. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.
97. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974).
98. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963).
99. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989); GRAY, supra note 58, at 78–84. One
might wonder how this rule squares with the facts in Katz. As the Court made clear in that
case, Katz did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as against visual surveillance in
a glass-walled public phone booth but did have an expectation of privacy as against aural
surveillance by virtue of his entering the booth and closing the door. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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“public observation doctrine,” the Court has held that looking into homes
from public thoroughfares and accessible airspace is not a search.100
Neither is looking for someone on public streets or using radio-beeper
tracking devices to follow someone’s public movements.101 Interestingly,
trespassing upon private land is also not a search, so long as agents do not
enter upon the curtilage immediately surrounding a home.102
The third-party doctrine and the public observation doctrine have
come under considerable scrutiny in recent years.103 So too have tangen-
tial rules governing Fourth Amendment standing.104 This is due in part to
the broad licenses these doctrines grant for government agents to deploy
and use a wide range of contemporary surveillance technologies, includ-
ing closed-circuit television camera networks, license plate readers,
drones, RFID tracking, cellular phone tracking, biometrics, and Big Data
(which allows for the aggregation and analysis of high volumes of varied
information from many vectors moving at high velocity). The emergence
and rapid expansion of these technologies mark ours as an age of surveil-
lance and pose the threat, if not the promise, of a surveillance state.105
Attentive to the consequences of broad and invasive government sur-
veillance, scholars, critics, and activists have been pushing the courts to
act. Some argue for revising the application of the Court’s reasonable
expectations of privacy standard, perhaps to include surveillance that is
long-term, data-intensive, or particularly revealing.106 Others advocate a
new definition of “search” that would encompass a wider range of gov-
ernment conduct.107 In a series of recent cases, a majority of the Justices
on the Supreme Court seem to be sympathetic to these concerns, result-
ing in new constitutional rules governing the installation of GPS tracking
devices108 and law enforcement access to the cell site location data gath-
ered and stored by cellular service providers.109 Regardless of where
these new lines of doctrine go, however, they are unlikely to provide
grounds for a Fourth Amendment right to go dark. The reason why is
100. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449–50; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
101. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
102. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 183 (1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individ-
ual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.”).
104. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 423 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
GRAY, supra note 58, at 89–92; David Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 77, 86–97 (2018); Christopher Slobogin, Standing and Covert
Surveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 517, 520–29 (2015); Arnold Loewy, The Fourth Amendment
as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1269–72 (1983).
105. GRAY, supra note 58, at 23–55; Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Po-
litical Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723–25 (2014);
Margaret Hu, Orwell’s 1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion
Test, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1819, 1829 (2017).
106. GRAY, supra note 58, at 104–29.
107. See, e.g., Gray & Citron, supra note 59, 62.
108. Jones, 565 U.S. at 412–13.
109. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
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evident if we return to the technology at issue in the San Bernardino case:
a cellular phone.
In 2014, the Court decided Riley v. California.110 Riley had been ar-
rested on weapons charges. During a search incident to arrest of his per-
son, officers found his cellular phone, which they accessed without a
warrant or claim of emergency.111 By examining messages, call logs, and
pictures on the phone, the officers established Riley’s ties to a gang and a
shooting incident.112 At trial, Riley unsuccessfully challenged the admissi-
bility of evidence derived from his phone.113 He was convicted and even-
tually appealed to the Supreme Court.114 In a decision remarkable for its
potentially far-reaching reasoning, the Court held that cellphone users
have a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of their
phones.115
Cellphones, the Riley Court pointed out, have become a ubiquitous
feature of modern life, to the point where they are, in essence, an exten-
sion of our bodies.116 Almost everyone has one. They go with us every-
where and have come to serve as repositories for a wide variety of
content and data.117 Phones are also conduits to data stored on third-
party servers.118 These features, in the Court’s view, put cellular phones
on par with homes, offices, and file cabinets, all of which are afforded the
highest levels of protection under the Fourth Amendment.119 Based on
this analysis, the Court held that accessing the contents of a cellular
phone is a search.120 Then it went further, holding that law enforcement
officers cannot rely on the search incident to arrest doctrine when search-
ing a cellular phone but, instead, must secure a warrant or cite facts suffi-
cient to justify an exception to the warrant requirement, such as an
emergency.121 The Court also suggested that accessing data stored in “the
cloud” would also be a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.122
In light of the Court’s holding in Riley, it is tempting to think that the
Fourth Amendment would provide grounds for a Fourth Amendment
right to go dark. What better way, after all, to ensure against unautho-
rized government snooping of our phones and data repositories linked to
our phones than to encrypt our devices and data stored in third-party
110. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
111. Id. at 378–79.
112. Id. at 379.
113. Id. at 373.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 401.
116. Id. at 385 (“[M]odern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent
part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an impor-
tant feature of human anatomy.”).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 397.
119. Id. at 396–97.
120. Id. at 401.
121. Id. at 401–02.
122. Id. at 397.
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servers? Although tempting, this conclusion does not immediately follow
from the holding in Riley.
Affording Fourth Amendment protections, whether to a home or
phone, is not the same as affording a right to go dark. Consider the text.
By its language, the Fourth Amendment guards only against threats of
unreasonable searches and seizures. Eo ipso, it does not grant any rights
of security against reasonable searches and seizures. In fact, some schol-
ars contend that the warrant clause, which describes a procedure for es-
tablishing the reasonableness of a search, implies that government agents
have a right to engage in reasonable searches and seizures.123 That is
probably a step too far. The fundamental role of the Fourth Amendment
is to limit government power, not the powers of the people or the conduct
of persons.124 But the fact that the text includes the warrant clause cer-
tainly cuts against any inference that the Fourth Amendment provides
the people or persons with a right to prevent reasonable searches. And,
that, of course, is precisely what a right to go dark would mean.
Consistent with this reading of the text, the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence does not provide ready grounds for a Fourth
Amendment right to go dark. The vast majority of the Court’s Fourth
Amendment doctrine governs nonconsensual searches, drawing lines be-
tween those that are and are not “reasonable.” Why bother if those sub-
ject to nonconsensual searches maintain final authority to prevent or
refuse a government search? Take, for example, the knock and announce
rule.125
The knock and announce rule allows officers serving a lawful warrant
to effectuate a forcible entry into a home so long as they knock, an-
nounce themselves, and provide those on the premises a reasonable op-
portunity to comply.126 The whole enterprise would be rendered
nonsensical if citizens had a right under the Fourth Amendment to deploy
walls, doors, and locks invulnerable to lawful entry. So, too, the Court’s
doctrine governing warranted searches, emergency searches, and special
needs searches. Why spill all this ink if the targets of searches ultimately
have final veto power over the authority of law enforcement, courts, and
administrative agencies to approve a lawful search? And then there is the
rather long line of cases dealing with consent searches.127 Read uncriti-
123. Corn & Brenner-Beck, supra note 23, at 338–48; Loewy, supra note 104, at
1231–44.
124. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (“[A] central aim of the
Framers was ‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’” (quot-
ing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948))); GRAY, supra note 58, at 249–51;
Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 444 (2007).
125. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
126. Id. at 931–32.
127. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–07 (2002) (holding that law enforce-
ment asking questions of passengers on a bus did not constitute an illegal seizure and that
consent given to search passenger and bags was valid); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35
(1996) (upholding consent to search a vehicle that was given after law enforcement com-
pleted valid traffic stop); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973) (holding
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cally, these cases might suggest that citizens can prevent searches and
seizures by simply refusing to give consent. But, of course, refusing to
give consent to search just pushes an encounter down another road, re-
quiring that officers secure a warrant or otherwise establish that they ac-
ted reasonably. Refusal to give consent is far from being the last word.
Recognizing a right to go dark under the Fourth Amendment would
also seem to run contrary to the balancing of interests implied in the
Amendment’s focus on reasonableness.128 The Court has long held that
determining what is “reasonable” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
requires striking a balance among the competing interests at stake.129 On
the one hand, searches compromise a target’s privacy interests, property
interests, and personal security interests.130 On the other hand, searches
advance governmental interests in public security, usually by facilitating
the detection, investigation, and prosecution of crime.131 The Justices
generally regard a search or a class of searches as reasonable for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment if they strike an appropriate balance among
these competing interests.132 Recognizing a right to go dark under the
Fourth Amendment would effectively render this balancing of interests
approach irrelevant. In fact, recognizing a right to go dark would virtually
extinguish the ability of government agents to use many investigative
techniques that play an important role in vindicating public interests, pro-
viding for public security, prosecuting crime, and protecting the public,
including its most vulnerable members.133
None of this means that the Fourth Amendment by itself would bar the
deployment and use of encryption or other efforts to go dark. The hum-
bler claim is simply that there is no right under the Fourth Amendment to
thwart lawful searches by physical or technological means. It follows that,
should Congress pass a law limiting the deployment and use of encryption
that a suspect need not know that he has the right to decline a search in order for the
search to be based on valid consent).
128. See, e.g., Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935–36 (discussing the balancing of property and law
enforcement interests underlying the knock and announce rule). See generally Orin S.
Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV.
476 (2011) (describing the Court’s ongoing effort to strike a reasonable balance between
privacy interests and law enforcement interests).
129. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934; Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560–63 (1978)
(balancing interests between law enforcement and third-parties); Warden, Md. Peniten-
tiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306–07 (1967) (balancing interests between law enforcement
and citizens in the seizure of “mere evidence”).
130. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 932; Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 560–61; Hayden, 387 U.S. at 310–11.
131. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936; Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 554–55; Hayden, 387 U.S. at 301.
132. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936; Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 559; Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298–99.
133. See Child Pornography, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/
child-pornography [https://perma.cc/6PQV-3ERA] (“The methods many offenders use to
evade law enforcement detection have also become increasingly sophisticated. Purveyors
of child pornography continue to use various encryption techniques and anonymous net-
works on ‘The Dark Internet’, attempting to hide their amassed collections of illicit child
abuse images. Several sophisticated online criminal organizations have even written secur-
ity manuals to ensure that their members follow preferred security protocols and encryp-
tion techniques in an attempt to evade law enforcement and facilitate the sexual abuse of
children.”).
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technologies capable of thwarting warranted searches, that law would not
be vulnerable to Fourth Amendment challenges.134 Thus, when it comes
to the Fourth Amendment itself, it seems that all we can say is, “If you
got a warrant, I guess you’re gonna come in.”135
The San Bernardino case provides a useful concrete example for elabo-
rating these points. The paradigm case of a reasonable search for pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment is one licensed by a warrant that is based
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, issued by a de-
tached and neutral magistrate, and that describes with particularity both
the place to be searched and the evidence sought.136 The agents in San
Bernardino had a probable cause warrant to search Farook’s phone. That
seems to be all the Fourth Amendment requires in order for their pro-
posed search to be reasonable.137 If we read the Fourth Amendment as
also guaranteeing a right to go dark, then, despite the officers’ compli-
ance with the demands of the warrant clause, Farook would still maintain
a superior right to prevent those officers from serving their warrant. This
would imply his further right to privilege his privacy interests above pub-
lic interests in identifying terrorist plots and preventing terrorist attacks,
not to mention our collective interests in prosecuting and punishing ter-
rorists. It is hard to see any evidence in the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment or the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for recognizing
such a right.
The Fourth Amendment guards against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It does not guarantee an additional right to secure oneself
against reasonable searches. Returning to our discussion of Riley, this
means that information and data can be deemed private under the Fourth
Amendment but nevertheless remain accessible to government agents
through lawful means. We can have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of our cellular phones but still not have a right to prevent
law enforcement from gaining access to our phones and data stored on
our phones if they have a warrant. That, it seems, is where the Fourth
Amendment rests on the right to go dark question. But might this conclu-
sion be too hasty? Might it miss the place of the Fourth Amendment in
our constitutional structure and the role it plays in addressing new threats
posed by modern surveillance capacities and practices?
Although the Katz Court framed the Fourth Amendment in terms of
privacy, the word “privacy” appears nowhere in the text. Neither do con-
cerns with protecting privacy appear in the drafting history of the Fourth
134. There might well be grounds to object on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g.,
Apple Inc’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 46, at 32–34.
135. GRATEFUL DEAD, Truckin’, on AMERICAN BEAUTY (Warner Bros. 1970).
136. GRAY, supra note 58, at 169–72.
137. This assumes, of course, that probable cause existed, that the officers abided the
terms of the warrant when conducting the search, and that the means and methods used
when conducting the search were not unreasonable in terms of the force used.
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Amendment.138 True, Fourth Amendment protections for houses sound
in common law treatments of homes as sovereign fiefdoms providing
spaces to which persons can withdraw from society, seeking succor from
the travails and vicissitudes of the world.139 But, tellingly, the Fourth
Amendment does not protect the privacy of persons in their homes. It
instead protects the right of “the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”140 That wording is not a matter of capricious happenstance. It
reflects a drafting history and historical context in which the Fourth
Amendment was understood as guaranteeing a collective right against the
unconstrained use of government powers to search and seize.141 Moreo-
ver, the Fourth Amendment was adopted against the backdrop of eight-
eenth century efforts to use search and seizure powers to suppress
political and religious freedom.142 In this regard, the Fourth Amendment
can and must be read as a precondition to functioning democracy that is
of a piece with rights guaranteed in Article I, the First Amendment, the
Second Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and the Tenth
Amendment.143
The democratic order imagined by the Constitution and Bill of Rights
is now in peril.144 There can be little doubt that we live in an age of sur-
veillance.145 The dystopian visions familiar from the works of George
Orwell, Aldous Huxley, and even J.R.R. Tolkien are upon us.146 Daily,
we are subjected to the threat or reality of visual surveillance from
closed-circuit television cameras.147 We are tracked through our cellular
phones and GPS-enabled devices.148 Our activities on- and off-line are
monitored through financial records and the volumes of “digital exhaust”
we generate every moment of our lives. The Snowden revelations and
138. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 93, 97 (Scalia, J., concurring); David Gray,
Fourth Amendment Categorical Imperative, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 14, 15 (2017).
139. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (“The maxim that ‘every
man’s house is his castle’ is made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to
the citizen.”).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
141. GRAY, supra note 58, at 146–56; David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as
Rights: The Warrant Requirement, 96 B.U. L. REV. 425, 443–57 (2016) [hereinafter Gray,
The Warrant Requirement].
142. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018); Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373, 382 (2014); Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.); Entick v. Carrington
(1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); GRAY, supra note 58, at 141–44, 160–65; Laura K. Dono-
hue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1195 (2016).
143. Gray, The Warrant Requirement, supra note 141, at 446–47; Anthony G. Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 432–33 (1974) (“[T]he
phraseology of the amendment, akin to that of the first and second amendments and the
ninth, [was not] accidental.”).
144. GRAY, supra note 58, at 23–55.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1–6; Hu, supra note 105, at 1824–25 (discussing the role of literary dystopias
in contemporary Fourth Amendment discourse).
147. Slobogin, supra note 105, at 1752–54.
148. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018).
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subsequent reporting have disclosed to the public both the extent of ex-
isting governmental surveillance and a clear ambition on the part of the
Executive Branch to achieve omniscience.149
As Justice Sonia Sotomayor has pointed out, the threat and reality of
broad and indiscriminate surveillance is “inimical to democratic soci-
ety.”150 As a government of the people, democratic societies are designed
for the people to watch the government, holding those in power to the
people’s standards through their critical gaze.151 In a surveillance society,
the vector of power runs in the other direction.152 In a surveillance state,
it is the people who are constantly judged and disciplined by govern-
ment’s gaze.153 We need not rely on fiction to see the dangers. The twen-
tieth century provides us with ample examples of oppressive regimes
where surveillance was deployed and used as a tool of social control.154
What the Snowden documents reveal is that we are standing at the preci-
pice of a constitutional crisis driven by ongoing government efforts to
conduct the kinds of broad and indiscriminate surveillance programs
characteristic of a surveillance state.
In the face of these challenges, the political branches have proven un-
willing or unable to constrain the rapid expansion of government surveil-
lance programs.155 Demonstrably buoyed by various interminable wars
(on terrorism, on drugs, on poverty, etc.), executive agencies have pur-
149. GRAY, supra note 58, at 43.
150. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The
Court appears to have embraced Justice Sotomayor’s views on the threats of broad and
indiscriminate surveillance. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014).
151. ORWELL ROLLS IN HIS GRAVE, at 13:25–14:00 (Sag Harbor-Basement Pictures
2003) (Professor Robert McChesney explains that “a self-governing society, a democratic
society” requires a media that “keeps track of people in power and people who want to be
in power”). See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY:
COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (1999).
152. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 49, 51
(2006) (arguing that “control of press access to information” allows the government to
manipulate public opinion).
153. Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom in
the Age of Data Hording, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 598–99 (2014) (discussing how
advanced surveillance technologies enable the government to infringe on the right of
association).
154. The Ministry for State Security (Stasi) of the former German Democratic Republic
employed an extensive network of informants and spies in order to quash dissent and
maintain control over the public. Virtually everyone in the German Democratic Republic
was either an employee/informant of the Stasi or a target of its oversight. See Paul M.
Schwartz, Constitutional Change and Constitutional Legitimation: The Example of German
Unification, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 1052–53 (1994).
155. In 2018, the House of Representatives voted to renew the NSA’s warrantless sur-
veillance program for another six years and rejected a bipartisan push to establish privacy
limits. Charlie Savage, Eileen Sullivan & Nicholas Fandos, House Extends Surveillance
Law, Rejecting New Privacy Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018) https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/01/11/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-congress-trump.html [https://perma.cc/D4YE-
AJRA]; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“To date, however, Congress and most States have not enacted statutes regulating the use
of GPS tracking technology for law enforcement purposes.”).
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sued more and greater surveillance powers.156 Perhaps fearful of the po-
litical consequences, legislatures have so far not set any real
constraints.157 Until recently, courts have often been similarly ineffectual
and, ironically, defer to the superior democratic legitimacy and policy ex-
pertise of the political branches.158 As a result, the security of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures has been dramatically de-
graded. Added to that is the problem of cheating. As the Snowden docu-
ments reveal, executive agents appear perfectly willing to violate even the
minimal constitutional and legal constraints under which they live, engag-
ing in illegal activities or outsourcing surveillance work to foreign states
and private contractors, who may not be subject to the same constitu-
tional constraints.159
None of this is unexpected. In fact, it is the natural teleology of the
executive state.160 The exercise of police and security powers inevitably
drives executive agents to pursue more and greater powers, including the
ability to conduct broad and pervasive surveillance. What better way to
fight crime and protect the public than to achieve omniscience? Of
course, it was precisely this well-understood trajectory of executive power
that inspired our founders to include structural constraints on the Execu-
tive in the body of the Constitution and to afford to persons and the peo-
156. See ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME
61–62 (2016) (explaining the federal push to integrate policing into the social welfare state
and how the war on crime and the war on poverty go hand-in-hand). See generally Gerald
G. Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge Between the War on Drugs and the War
on Terrorism, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 753 (2006) (describing the parallels in development in
the wars on drugs and terror through increased surveillance); Corey Rayburn Yung, The
Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2010) (explor-
ing what defines a war on crime and the emergence of a war on sex offenders).
157. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
158. Three of the most promising of these recent decisions are Carpenter, 138 S. Ct.
2206 (2018), regulating law enforcement access to cell site location date; State v. Andrews,
227 Md. App. 350 (2016), regulating the deployment and use of cell site simulators; and
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, regulating the installation of GPS tracking devices during criminal
investigations.
159. Kim Zetter, NSA Is Intercepting Traffic from Yahoo, Google Data Centers, WIRED
(Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/10/nsa-hacked-yahoo-google-cables/ [https://
perma.cc/6R54-LLGA].
160. 2 Francis Maseres, The Canadian Freeholder: In Three Dialogues Between an En-
glishman and a Frenchman, Settled in Canada 243–44 (London, B. White 1779) (comment-
ing on Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.), and noting that appointed
members of the executive are “fond of the doctrines of reason of state, and state necessity,
and the impossibility of providing for great emergencies and extraordinary cases, without a
discretionary power in the Crown to proceed sometimes by uncommon methods not agree-
able to the known forms of law.” ); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)
(“Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of
actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their substance and essence, and
effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure.”).
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ple rights designed, in part, to guarantee security against overreaching
executive power.161
From this perspective, we can see our current crisis as the result of a
structural failure. The coordinate branches have simply failed to perform
their roles. Given this state of affairs, might the Fourth Amendment im-
ply a right to self-help? Might it entail a right of the people to secure for
themselves their constitutional birthright when Congress and the courts
fail to act?
Although there is no recognized right to go dark in the Supreme
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, there is a substantial case to
be made that the Fourth Amendment, as a guardian of democratic princi-
ples, contains a residual right to self-help. That right is prominent in the
Katz definition of “search,” which requires that a subject manifest an ex-
pectation of privacy.162 Much discussion of the Court’s Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence since 1967 has focused on what expectations of
privacy are “reasonable.” But that is only half of the inquiry under Katz.
Courts are also interested in whether a target has manifested an expecta-
tion of privacy.163 Here, countermeasures and other forms of self-help
play an important role in guaranteeing Fourth Amendment rights. Just as
examples, the courts have encouraged citizens to erect fences around
their yards,164 close doors,165 shutter windows,166 deploy blinds,167 and
conduct their affairs behind opaque walls.168 Encryption and other efforts
161. See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (K.B.) (“[W]e can safely say
there is no law in this country to justify the defendants [in executing a search unsupported
by law or precedent]; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society.”); see also
Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (stating that Entick “is a ‘case we have described as a ‘monument in
English Freedom’’” and is considered “‘the true and ultimate expression of constitutional
law’ with regard to search and seizure” (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593,
596 (1989))); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“The right of officers to
thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”).
162. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is
a twofold requirement, first that a person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as ‘reasonable.’”).
163. But see generally Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjec-
tive Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015) (arguing that courts only look at reasona-
ble expectation of privacy and never subjective manifestation).
164. Massachusetts v. Podgurski, 459 U.S. 1222, 1224 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting that an officer looking inside a van’s open door does not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment).
165. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 36–37 (1963) (holding that marijuana observed
through an open doorway was admissible under the plain view doctrine).
166. See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671–72 (2018) (suggesting in dicta that
anything observed through an open window does not constitute a search); Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1989) (holding that peering into openings in the roof of an enclosed
greenhouse from public airspace is not a search).
167. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 85, 91 (1998) (holding that a warrant was sup-
ported by valid probable cause when officer observed respondents bagging cocaine
through respondents’ window).
168. See supra note 166; cf. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742–43 (1983) (holding that
law enforcement could seize heroin observed through the windows of a car during a rou-
tine driver’s license checkpoint).
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to go dark may be viewed as another in this long line of countermeasures,
manifesting an expectation of privacy against data and electronic surveil-
lance in the same way that traditional countermeasures manifest expecta-
tions of privacy against aural and visual surveillance. Nobody would
contest the right of citizens to erect a fence or close a blind in order to
protect against government snooping. Why should encryption be
different?
The easy answer, of course, is that law enforcement officers can climb
over a fence, open a door, or pull back a curtain. The problem with en-
cryption is precisely that government agents acting lawfully cannot open
an encrypted device or reveal encrypted data. Although there is certainly
a right under the Fourth Amendment to manifest an expectation of pri-
vacy, it is quite a different proposition to claim that there is a right to
prevent even lawful and reasonable searches and seizures. But that is a
conclusion for reasonable times.
We live in a world where law enforcement has been granted an effec-
tive license to conduct a whole range of surveillance activities without
real legal limits. New technologies have virtually removed any practical
constraints on the exercise of that license. Intoxicated by the powers ac-
companying these expanded capacities, law enforcement and other gov-
ernment agencies have engaged in programs of broad and indiscriminate
surveillance, threatening the core democratic values guarded by the
Fourth Amendment. In our current environment, encryption and other
technological means for going dark may provide the only realistic way for
citizens to protect themselves against overreaching and oppressive gov-
ernment surveillance. If that is the only way for we, the people, to guar-
antee our collective right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures, then that existential reality might necessitate recognizing a com-
plementary right to go dark.
Experiences with cellular phone technology during the 1990s provide a
useful precedent. When first deployed, cellular phones were little more
than handheld radios.169 They used standard analog technology in com-
mon use on two-way radios.170 The only real differences between these
phones and two-way radios were that cellphones used a different fre-
quency range and communicated through the intermediary of a cell net-
work.171 Cellular phone signals were fairly easy to intercept.172 Just about
anyone with a broad-band radio receiver could eavesdrop on conversa-
tions. Wireless home telephones operated on the same basic technol-
ogy.173 Conversations conducted using early cellphones and wireless
169. GRAY, supra note 58, at 32.
170. Id.
171. Id.; Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret
Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly Over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Im-
pact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 51–53 (2014).
172. GRAY, supra note 58, at 32.
173. Id. at 32–33.
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home telephones were notoriously susceptible to interception.174 In the
wake of several high-profile incidents, the Federal Communication Com-
mission introduced regulations that sought to protect the privacy of com-
munications over wireless analog telephones.175 Those regulations were
notoriously hard to enforce, however. The interception technology was
already out there, easy to make, and virtually impossible to detect.176 The
whole crisis came to an abrupt end when telephone manufacturers and
cellular phone services converted to digital technologies that facilitated
the widespread use of encryption.177 There were hiccups, of course, such
as when first generation A5/1 encryption was publicly broken in 1999,
rendering transparent most communications on first generation cellular
networks.178 But cellular phone providers have regularly upgraded their
networks, allowing for the introduction of A5/3 and A5/4 encryption,
both of which remain immune from decryption by all but perhaps the
most sophisticated national security agencies.179
Experiences with the interception of cellular phone signals and encryp-
tion as a self-help tool certainly seem to provide a useful precedent for a
twenty-first century right to go dark. There is, of course, an important
difference. No matter how robust the signals encryption deployed and
used by cellular phone companies, service providers retain the ability to
decrypt those signals. In fact, they are required to as a matter of statute
under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.180 As a
consequence, government agents armed with a lawful warrant issued
under the Wiretap Act can gain access to the contents of encrypted cellu-
lar phone conversations.181 Contemporary going dark technologies take
matters one critical step further by rendering data and communications
content opaque even to service providers. But, given the nature of con-
temporary threats, the ubiquity of electronic communications and data,
and the key roles these technologies play in our lives, going dark may
well be the only way to truly guarantee our security against threats of
unreasonable search and seizure. If that is the case, then should we not
have a right to do it?
III. A FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO GO DARK (?)
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person . . . shall be com-
174. Id.
175. Jerry Gray, Florida Couple Are Charged In Taping of Gingrich Call, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1997, at A2; Travis LeBlanc & Lindsay DeFrancesco, The Federal Commission as
Privacy Regulator, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 727 (David
Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017).
176. LeBlanc & DeFrancesco, supra note 175, at 746–47.
177. GRAY, supra note 58, at 33; Pell & Soghoian, supra note 171, at 51–53.
178. GRAY, supra note 58, at 33; Pell & Soghoian, supra note 171, at 51–53.
179. GRAY, supra note 58, at 33; Pell & Soghoian, supra note 171, at 51–53.
180. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002 (2012). For a concise discussion of CALEA, see LeBlanc & DeFrancesco, supra
note 175, at 748–49.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2).
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pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”182 Tracing
its roots to seventeenth century common law and responses to the abuses
of the Star Chamber,183 the Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pelled witnessing is first and foremost a trial right.184 It guarantees that
no criminal defendant can be compelled by the state to take the witness
stand and testify against herself in a formal magisterial proceeding on
pain of contempt, fine, or adverse inference.185 That made good sense in
1791, when investigative law enforcement agencies were virtually nonex-
istent.186 But the Fifth Amendment’s protections had been compromised
considerably by the end of the nineteenth century when professionalized
law enforcement agencies charged with detecting, investigating, and pros-
ecuting crime became a more common fixture in American society.187
Professional law enforcement investigators were making frequent use
of interrogations by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.188
Their goal was to secure confessions (sometimes by extreme means),189
which could then be admitted into evidence at a later criminal trial.190
These tactics created new challenges for the Fifth Amendment. If you can
be compelled to make incriminatory statements or to provide evidence to
investigators for later use at trial, then it is of little solace to know that
you will be free to sit mute while being damned by your own words.191 In
response to these new challenges, the Court extended the Fifth Amend-
ment right against compelled witnessing to other forums.192 Among the
most familiar instances of this expansion is Miranda v. Arizona, which
provides a right against compelled self-incrimination during custodial
interrogations.193
Although revolutionary when it was decided in 1966, Miranda has its
roots in the 1886 case Boyd v. United States.194 Boyd is particularly rele-
182. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
183. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination from John Lilburne
to Ollie North, 5 CONST. COMM. 405, 405–06 (1988).
184. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004).
185. Id. at 637; Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588–89 (1990).
186. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 527 (1966); GRAY, supra note 58, at 197;
Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The
Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-incrimination as a “Trial Right” in Chavez v.
Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2003); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 620–21 (1999); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The
Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 447–48
(2010); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
824 (1994); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1389, 1395 (1989).
187. GRAY, supra note 58, at 197–99.
188. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445–46 (discussing how emerging police forces adopted
the use of incommunicado interrogations).
189. See id. at 446 (describing violent interrogation methods); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 281–83 (1936) (documenting a brutal interrogation that included partial lynching
of a suspect).
190. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446; GRAY, supra note 58, at 198–99.
191. GRAY, supra note 58, at 197–98.
192. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
193. Id. at 463.
194. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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vant to the question whether the Fifth Amendment might support a right
to go dark. In that case, federal authorities suspected that Boyd was
dodging import taxes owed on, among other goods, shipments of plate
glass from England.195 In an effort to gather evidence against him, prose-
cutors sought to review invoices associated with Boyd’s import busi-
ness.196 They secured a court order under the authority of a federal
statute forcing Boyd to produce those documents.197 Boyd complied
under protest, arguing that he was being compelled to provide the gov-
ernment with incriminating evidence in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment.198 He was convicted and then appealed to the Supreme Court,
which sided with Boyd.199 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Joseph
Bradley reported that “we have been unable to perceive that the seizure
of a man’s private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against him-
self.”200 On that basis, the Court held that
compelling the production of . . . private books and papers, to con-
vict [a party] of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the
principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an
Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may
suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure
atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.201
Heady stuff—and it is highly suggestive of a potential Fifth Amend-
ment ground for a right to go dark.
There can be no doubt that the contents of our digital devices and elec-
tronic communications hold the potential for incrimination. Consider
Riley v. California, the case in which the Supreme Court held that acces-
sing the contents of a cellular phone is a search governed by the warrant
requirement.202 Photographs, contacts, and texts found on Riley’s phone
implicated him in gang activity and a shooting incident, providing prose-
cutors with key evidence critical to his conviction.203 Might Riley, and
therefore any of us, contend that being forced to disclose the contents of
our devices or electronic communications is an act of compelled witness-
ing akin to Boyd’s being compelled to produce documents?204 The
Court’s reasoning in Boyd definitely suggests that we could. And, if this is
right, then might we argue further that the only way to truly secure that
right is through the deployment of robust encryption capable of guaran-
195. Id. at 618–19.
196. Id. at 619.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 618.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 633.
201. Id. at 631–32.
202. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
203. Id. at 379–80.
204. For a brief but insightful discussion of these questions, see generally Bryan H.
Choi, The Privilege Against Cellphone Incrimination, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 73 (2019).
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teeing with absolute certainty the security of our digitized data?205
In 1886, it at least seems that there might well have been good grounds
for a Fifth Amendment right to go dark. The problem is that, while the
Court was expanding the procedural reach of the Fifth Amendment in
Miranda and other cases, it was also busy limiting the scope of its applica-
tion by adopting a narrow view of what conduct constitutes being a “wit-
ness” and what kind of witnessing is “compelled.”
In an infamous opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, Justice
William Brennan carved Boyd back considerably by adopting a narrow
definition of what it is to “be a witness.”206 Muniz had been arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol.207 During the booking process,
which was videotaped, he was asked a series of standard administrative
questions, including his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of
birth, and current age.208 He was also asked for the date of his sixth birth-
day.209 At trial, the tape from his booking procedure was admitted to
show that Muniz was unsteady, hesitant in answering questions, slurring
his words, and unable to report accurately the date of his sixth birth-
day.210 Relying on prior precedent, Justice Brennan reasoned that
Muniz’s physical comportment and the manner of his expression were not
“testimonial” because that conduct did not disclose the results of a
mental process.211 Unlike factual assertions or disclosures of information,
behavioral manifestations of drunkenness do not reveal the inner work-
ings of the mind.212 Although Muniz’s answers to the booking questions
did entail assertions of fact and disclosures of information and therefore
were “testimonial,” Justice Brennan pointed out that requests for this
kind of biographical information were necessary to the routine adminis-
trative process of booking arrestees and therefore were exempt from
Fifth Amendment protections.213 The question relating to the date of
Muniz’s sixth birthday was different, however, in that it required expres-
sing the results of a mental process but was not reasonably related to the
booking process.214 Evidence relating to that question and his response
therefore fell within the compass of the Fifth Amendment’s
protections.215
The other line of twentieth century doctrine that has limited signifi-
cantly the scope and reach of Boyd addresses when a testimonial expres-
205. See id. (arguing that some digital data should be subject to Fifth Amendment
protections).
206. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990).
207. Id. at 585.
208. Id. at 585–86.
209. Id. at 586.
210. Id. at 587.
211. Id. at 604; Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 761 (1966).
212. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 598–99, 601.
215. Id. at 599–600.
648 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
sion is “compelled.”216 In Fisher v. United States, the Court held that “the
Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled pro-
duction of . . . incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is
compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.”217
In particular, the Court reasoned, compelling the production of docu-
ments that a suspect created previously by a voluntary act does not neces-
sarily implicate the Fifth Amendment even if those voluntarily created
documents contain self-incriminatory statements that might be regarded
as testimonial under Muniz.218 The Court allowed that the act of produc-
tion might itself be testimonial but maintained that the Fifth Amendment
provides no independent protection for the contents of documents volun-
tarily created such as diaries, journals, and business records.219
Together, Muniz and Fisher voided much of the pomp and promise of
Boyd. They also seem to limit significantly the potential for a right to go
dark grounded in the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled wit-
nessing. That is because much of the content law enforcement agencies
might want to access on digital devices is not testimonial, not compelled,
or is neither testimonial nor compelled. Consider again the facts in Riley.
There, the investigating officers were interested in texts and pictures
Riley had created of his own volition, free from state compulsion.220 As a
consequence, those documents were excluded from Fifth Amendment
protections under Fisher. Officers were also interested in call records and
contact lists stored on Riley’s phone, none of which were results of
Riley’s mental processes.221 In fact, at least with respect to call records,
the information was not even created by Riley. Instead, that data was an
artifact produced by his phone and installed apps, which created and re-
ported those records independent of any conduct on his part. True
enough, Riley initiated the underlying calls, but the data about those calls
was not the result of any act of expression or mental process on his part.
By a similar analysis, the location data routinely gathered and stored
by personal devices, and particularly cellular phones, probably would not
qualify for Fifth Amendment protection under current doctrine. Con-
sider, as an example, cell site location information (CSLI). Whenever
they are turned on, our cellular phones are in regular contact with the
network of cellular base stations maintained by our service providers.222
Each one of these “pings” generates a fairly precise location data
point.223 These data points are gathered by service providers at regular
intervals—usually every few seconds.224 Most providers store that data
216. Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 820
(2005).
217. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
218. Id. at 409–10.
219. Id. at 411.
220. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 379 (2014).
221. Id.
222. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018).
223. See id.
224. See id.
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for several years, which means that they possess a virtual “time machine”
capable of retracing our past movements and creating a detailed history
of our lives.225 That kind of information has extraordinary law enforce-
ment potential. For example, in Carpenter, investigators reviewed several
months of cell site location data to document Carpenter’s proximity to a
number of armed robberies.226 That objective evidence was valuable in
itself but also provided important corroboration of testimony offered by
coconspirators.227
The Carpenter Court ultimately held that CSLI is protected by the
Fourth Amendment.228 But is it also subject to Fifth Amendment protec-
tion? Given the current state of the law, it seems unlikely that it would
be. CSLI is generated automatically as users’ phones interact with service
providers. There is no expressive act involved. None of this is the result of
a user’s mental processes. The data is aggregated and stored by cellular
service providers. That process is also automatic, and also is not expres-
sive. One might argue that there is an expressive act at the root of the
process. After all, someone decided to gather and store the data, wrote
the code, and installed the system. But to the extent this preparatory con-
duct can render the creation, gathering, and storing of CSLI expressive, it
is still voluntary, not compelled.229 Even if it was compelled,230 any po-
tential Fifth Amendment claim would belong to the cellular service pro-
vider, not the customer, because it is the cellular service provider who is
being compelled to “speak.” But, of course, corporations are not “per-
sons” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and therefore cannot resist
requests to disclose business records on Fifth Amendment grounds.231 So,
although the Fourth Amendment might require law enforcement to get a
warrant for CSLI, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelled
witnessing does not seem to provide any additional constitutional
protections.
These are points worth amplifying. Much of the data that law enforce-
ment is likely to want to access on phones and other devices is created by
these devices without any intentional actions on the part of users.232 Con-
225. Id. at 2218; Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (And What
They Might Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933 (2016).
226. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 2222.
229. Id. at 2217–18.
230. There is a reasonable argument to be made here that cellular service providers are
“compelled” to gather and store CSLI, at least for short, relatively contemporary periods
of time. That is because Federal Communication Commission regulations require that cel-
lular service providers be able to identify the locations of callers who use cellular phones to
call 911. See Stephanie K. Pell, Location Tracking, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
SURVEILLANCE LAW 44, 49 (David Gray & Stephen Henderson eds., 2017). But there is no
federal mandate that service providers maintain long records of CSLI or store that infor-
mation for an extended period of time.
231. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409–10 (1976).
232. See, e.g., Amanda Watts, Cops Use Murdered Woman’s Fitbit to Charge Her Hus-
band, CNN (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/25/us/fitbit-womans-death-inves
tigation-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/DG7H-KUTT]; see also Jacob Gershman, Prose-
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sider a recent case in Germany.233 Prosecutors there were assembling evi-
dence against a defendant, Hussein K., who was charged with raping and
murdering a woman before disposing of her body next to a river.234 In-
vestigators were able to establish a pretty clear timeline of the crime, in-
cluding the period during which the killer had dragged his victim’s body
down an embankment to the river’s edge.235 Although their suspect was
not cooperating, investigators were able to access his iPhone, including
data stored on its Health app, which has been an embedded feature of
iOS since 2014.236 That data documented the suspect’s descending
“stairs” and then ascended “stairs” during the timeframe when the perpe-
trator had disposed of the victim’s body.237 Not only that, the phone’s
descent and ascent was roughly equivalent to the height of the embank-
ment next to the river where the victim’s body was found.238 This was a
tidy little piece of detective work made possible by a commonly carried
electronic device that constantly gathers and stores data documenting
how many steps a user has taken and how many stairs he has climbed.
But what is important for present purposes is that none of that informa-
tion was in any way the result of an act of expression by the user. Neither
was the generation or recording of that data “compelled” by any govern-
ment agent.
Although not relevant in the German case, location data gathered and
stored by phones and other personal devices can also be useful in estab-
lishing a suspect’s proximity to a crime or locations associated with a
criminal enterprise. Take, as an example, Carpenter. There, investigators
used CSLI to tie Carpenter to a series of armed robberies by showing that
his phone was in close proximity to the crimes when they occurred.239
Granted, the location data at issue there came from his cellular phone
provider rather than the phone itself, but the case nevertheless demon-
strates the investigative value of precise location data. United States v.
cutors Say Fitbit Device Exposed Fibbing in Rape Case, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2016), https:/
/blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/04/21/prosecutors-say-fitbit-device-exposed-fibbing-in-rape-case/
[https://perma.cc/WY5N-P8CG]; Christine Hauser, Police Use Fitbit Data to Charge 90-
Year-Old Man in Stepdaughter’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/10/03/us/fitbit-murder-arrest.html?partner=rss&amp;emc=rss [https://perma.cc/
E2AU-TT8S]. Data from these devices is also being used in civil litigation. See, e.g., Samuel
Gibbs, Court Sets Legal Precedent with Evidence from Fitbit Health Tracker, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/18/court-accepts-data-
fitbit-health-tracker [https://perma.cc/NMU5-XKAE].
233. See Philip Kuhn, Die Version vom Handeln im Affekt ist mit dem heutigen Tag
obsolet, WELT (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article172287105/Mordpro
zess-Hussein-K-Die-Version-vom-Handeln-im-Affekt-ist-mit-dem-heutigen-Tag-obsolet
.html [https://perma.cc/A6JA-NCHE]. My thanks to Dr. Dominik Herrmann of the Otto-
Friedrich-Universita¨t Bamberg for drawing my attention to this case.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.; Hugh Langley & Husain Sumra, How to Use Apple Health: Everything You
Need to Know About the Platform, WAREABLE (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.wareable.com/
apple/how-to-use-apple-health-iphone-fitness-app-960 [https://perma.cc/69VV-9ZN2].
237. Kuhn, supra note 233.
238. Id.
239. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018).
2019] Right to Go Dark (?) 651
Jones provides another example.240 In that case, officers used location
data generated by a GPS tracking device attached to Jones’s vehicle to
document his regular proximity to areas associated with a drug conspir-
acy.241 Importantly, that location data was generated by a government-
installed device rather than Jones’s phone, but as Justice Sotomayor
pointed out in her influential concurrence in that case, “[w]ith increasing
regularity, the government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring
undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-installed vehicle
tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”242 Amplifying this point,
Chief Justice Roberts has compared cellular phones to ankle monitors
that allow “the Government” to “achiev[e] near perfect surveillance,” not
just of identified suspects, but all of us.243 Moreover, much of that data is
shared with software applications and stored both on the devices and in
the cloud.244 Nevertheless, under the Court’s current Fifth Amendment
doctrine, location data generated by native GPS chips, stored on our de-
vices, and shared through the cloud would all be voluntarily produced,
apparently immunizing the data from Fifth Amendment protection.
Personal information and location data do not remotely exhaust the
kinds of information gathered and stored by electronic devices that might
be of interest to law enforcement. For example, many folks now wear
fitness trackers and other devices capable of gathering biometric data in-
cluding heartrate and documenting the precise nature of their move-
ments.245 There are even sunglasses that monitor brain waves.246 How
helpful would it have been for investigators in the German case if they
could have accessed data showing that their suspect had an elevated hear-
trate during the timeframe when the victim’s body was moved and dis-
carded? How much better if they could document that he was engaged in
a lot of pulling, lifting, and dragging—all movements that would be re-
corded by a device to monitor users engaged in sports like CrossFit? To
shift the hypothetical, imagine that officers are investigating a car acci-
dent where they suspect that one of the drivers fell asleep behind the
wheel. It would certainly be helpful if officers could access the driver’s
Fitbit to see whether his heartrate had dropped just before the crash and
his smart glasses to see whether his head lolled and his brainwaves
240. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
241. Id. at 403–04.
242. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
243. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
244. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014).
245. Many fitness trackers are capable of automatically sensing not only when a user
has started to exercise but also the activity and specific data relevant to that activity such as
cadence rate for runners and strokes per minute for swimmers. See, e.g., FITBIT, INC.,
FITBIT CHARGE 3 USER MANUAL 34 (2019), https://staticcs.fitbit.com/content/assets/help/
manuals/manual_charge_3_en_US.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWM2-B6BM].
246. Husain Sumra, Smith Lowdown Focus Review, WAREABLE (Feb. 22, 2018), https://
www.wareable.com/reviews/smith-lowdown-focus-smartglasses-review [https://perma.cc/
PK2Q-7P6Q]; A Deep Dive Into Brainwaves: Brainwave Frequencies Explained, MUSE
(June 25, 2018), https://choosemuse.com/blog/a-deep-dive-into-brainwaves-brainwave-fre
quencies-explained-2/ [https://perma.cc/5UFR-S8QS].
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slipped into a pattern consistent with dozing off.247 Better still, imagine
that they had evidence that his heartrate and brainwaves had fluctuated
several times in the minutes before the crash, documenting a pattern of
dozing and reawakening. That kind of evidence would be useful not only
to determine what happened but also to establish that the driver had ac-
ted recklessly.
Although no court has squarely addressed the Fifth Amendment status
of data on digital devices, cases dealing with similar kinds of information
seem to assume that voluntarily or incidentally created information falls
within the exceptions carved out by Muniz and Fisher. That is evident in a
relatively new set of cases dealing with the Fifth Amendment conse-
quences of compelling a suspect to decrypt encrypted digital data.248 Un-
surprisingly, a stable consensus has formed for the proposition that
compelling a suspect to decrypt encrypted devices or data by non-expres-
sive means, such as a fingerprint or through facial recognition, does not
implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled witnessing.249
By contrast, courts are divided on the question whether compelling a sus-
pect to disclose or input a passcode is barred by the Fifth Amendment.250
Some courts have concluded that disclosing or inputting a passcode is
testimonial and entitled to full Fifth Amendment protections.251 Others
have admitted the testimonial status of passcodes but have compelled
production under the foregone conclusion doctrine, which allows courts
to compel testimonial expressions when what is revealed has been estab-
lished by independent means.252 As applied to data on personal devices,
this suggests that, if officers can show that a device belongs to a suspect,
then it is a foregone conclusion that the suspect knows the password and
therefore can be compelled to disclose that password to law enforcement
247. This same kind of data would be generated by worn or onboard systems designed
to notify drivers if they are losing attention or drifting to sleep. Systems and devices such as
these are already available on the consumer market with more sophisticated systems capa-
ble of monitoring mood, emotion, and other factors affecting driver safety on the horizon.
See, e.g., Affectiva Automotive AI, AFFECTIVA, https://www.affectiva.com/product/affecti
va-automotive-ai/ [https://perma.cc/27MJ-NY5B] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
248. Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
97 TEX. L. REV. 768, 768–70 (2019); Laurent Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment:
Passwords and Encrypted Devices, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 205–10 (2018).
249. Kerr, supra note 248, at 796. But see Sacharoff, supra note 248, at 241 (arguing
against Kerr); Laurent Sacharoff, What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone?
A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63–64 (2019) (same).
250. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670
F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2012) (declaring that compelled decryption violates the Fifth
Amendment), and United States v. Mitchell, 76 M.J. 413, 420 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (holding
that appellees phone was decrypted in violation of the Fifth Amendment), with United
States v. Apple Mac Pro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2017) (allowing compelled
decryption), United States v. Spencer, No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1, 2018 WL 1964588, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018) (same), United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D.
Colo. 2012) (same), State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136–37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (same),
Seo v. State, 109 N.E.3d 418, 425–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), vacated, 119 N.E.3d 90 (2018)
(compelled decryption not allowed), and Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605,
614–15 (Mass. 2014) (allowing compelled decryption).
251. See cases cited supra note 250.
252. See cases cited supra note 250.
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without violating his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
witnessing.253
Although the law governing compelled decryption is still developing,
what is most notable about these cases for the present exploration is what
courts and commentators seem to assume: that the contents themselves
have no independent claim to Fifth Amendment protection.254 But is that
so obvious? It may be if we look at electronic devices through an analog
lens. From this perspective, our electronic devices are vessels akin to dia-
ries, datebooks, and file cabinets stocked with voluntarily created docu-
ments. But are smartphones and wearable devices really the same as
diaries and datebooks? Perhaps not.
The Supreme Court has recognized some basic anthropological facts
about our personal devices: they are ubiquitous, and increasingly, they
are part of us.255 More and more, our electronic devices act as extensions
of our carbon-selves. They go with us everywhere, which gives them ac-
cess to events, experiences, and memories that are uniquely ours. They
are parallel first-person observers, but they are also enhancements, al-
lowing us to augment or outsource many functions we once performed
using our factory-installed, carbon-based processors. They remember for
us. They remind us. They keep track of where we have been and with
whom. They monitor our activity, movement, heartrate, and even our
mood. They add to our funds of knowledge. And this is just the begin-
ning. We are in the midst of an ongoing process of coevolution with digi-
tal technologies. At the forefront are devices that are surgically
implanted, in whole or in part, literally becoming part of us.256 We might
now speak metaphorically of devices that are “an important feature of
human anatomy,”257 but today’s metaphor is likely to be tomorrow’s lit-
eralism. We are becoming cyborgs, and these devices are part of us.258
If our present relationship with electronic devices marks the beginning
of our next evolutionary step, then rules developed to contend with ana-
log technologies like pen and paper appear to have little relevance. To see
the point, imagine that neuroscientists were able to break the code of
human cognition and developed a device capable of reading thoughts and
memories.259 Would the Fifth Amendment allow law enforcement to
253. Kerr, supra note 248, at 773–77.
254. But see Choi, supra note 204, at 74 (arguing against the separation of devices and
data when analyzing the Fifth Amendment status of cellular phones as extensions of users);
Slobogin, supra note 216, at 841–44 (arguing that the Fifth Amendment should respect a
“zone of privacy” protecting some kinds of personal documents).
255. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
256. Haley Weiss, Why You’re Probably Getting a Microchip Implant Someday, ATLAN-
TIC (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/09/how-i-
learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-microchip/570946/ [https://perma.cc/WJM5-3PGH].
257. Riley, 573 U.S. at 385.
258. The idea that electronic devices can become so integrated with ourselves and our
lives so as to extend our cognition was advanced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. See
generally Andy Clark & David Chalmers, The Extended Mind, 58 ANALYSIS 7 (1998).
259. MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW (2013);
Michael S. Pardo, Lying, Deception, and fMRI: A Critical Update, in NEUROLAW AND RE-
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compel someone to submit to having his mind read?260 On one reading of
Fisher and Muniz, the answer seems to be yes.261 After all, memories are
voluntarily or incidentally created and simply reading those memories off
a brain would not require an act of expression on the part of a brain’s
owner. But, upon further consideration, it is clear that arguments along
these lines are fallacies based on a fantasy.
The fantasy is a form of dualism. This defense of mind readers imagines
that our brains exist separately from our minds, souls, or selves.262 The
Fifth Amendment, so it goes, protects the ghost in the machine,263 not the
meat. Violating the flesh does not sully the soul. This dualistic account of
the mind has been roundly debunked by both philosophers264 and
neuroscientists.265 Although it may be helpful in certain contexts to speak
in loose metaphors about our minds as if they exist apart from our brains,
they do not; and it is potentially catastrophic to hold otherwise in any
context that matters. This is surely one such situation. Taking seriously a
dualistic account of mind and body when faced with the prospect of mind
reading technology would eviscerate Fifth Amendment protections. After
all, we are talking about strapping someone down to a table and forcibly
penetrating their innermost thoughts and memories on grounds that the
Fifth Amendment provides greater protections for our mouths than our
brains and the thin claim that reading thoughts off our brains does not in
any way violate our minds. So, even if a scientific method was devised to
penetrate the phenomenon of the mind, the brutality of that process
would run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.
Courts have not had to take seriously threats posed to the Fifth
Amendment by mind reading technologies because no such technologies
yet exist. As it stands, our thoughts and memories are encrypted by our
inscrutable brains. Nevertheless, it seems quite likely that if investigating
agents could compel a suspect to submit to a scan that would decrypt the
electrical firings along neural pathways in her brain, then the Fifth
SPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION (Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov ed., Cambridge University Press,
2018).
260. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of Mind Reading, 15 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 214, 216–21 (2013); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV.
351, 351–408 (2012).
261. Brennan-Marquez, supra note 260, at 240–41; Farahany, supra note 260, at 397–99.
262. The dualist conception of the self traces back at least as far as Plato but is usually
associated with the work of Rene Descartes. See, e.g., RENE´ DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON
FIRST PHILOSOPHY, Meditation VI (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1641). Cartesian dualism is
a form of what some contemporary philosophers have described as a physicalist or prop-
erty dualism. Noted philosophers like Chalmers and Frank Jackson defend a form of phe-
nomenalist dualism focused on the explanatory gap between a description of externally
observable conditions of a phenomenon and the subjective experience of a phenomenon.
263. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 18 (Routledge 2009) (1949).
264. See, e.g., id.
265. See., e.g., THOMAS SZASZ, THE MEANING OF MIND: LANGUAGE, MORALITY, AND
NEUROSCIENCE 106 (1996); George Windholz, Pavlov and the Mind-Body Problem, INTE-
GRATED PHYSIOLOGICAL & BEHAV. SCI., Apr. 1997, at 149–51.
2019] Right to Go Dark (?) 655
Amendment would stand in the way.266 If that is right, then it seems that,
for the same reasons, we might have good Fifth Amendment grounds to
claim a right to go dark. Biology renders our brains opaque to the world
unless we choose to decrypt and disclose by some act of expression. The
right to go dark, in the form of robust encryption, provides parallel pro-
tections for our silicon-based neural enhancements. It is digital insurance
that puts our silicon minds on the same footing with our carbon minds,
guaranteeing our right against compelled witnessing no matter where we
keep and store our thoughts and memories.
IV. A COMMON LAW RIGHT TO GO DARK (?)
A third potential ground for a right to go dark is the law of evidentiary
privileges. Evidentiary privileges protect the contents of certain commu-
nications against “involuntary disclosure.”267 Although established by
statute in many states, evidentiary privileges are grounded in the common
law and remain a creature of common law in many jurisdictions, including
federal courts. In the federal system, courts’ authority to recognize and
elaborate evidentiary privileges derives from Federal Rule of Evidence
501, which, in its revised form, provides that:
The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light
of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of
the following provides otherwise:
• the United States Constitution;
• a federal statute; or
• rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or
defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.268
The history of Rule 501 is fascinating. The Supreme Court proposed a
very different version of Rule 501 to Congress in 1973.269 As then con-
266. This would, after all, be akin to the kinds of techniques utilized during the Inquisi-
tions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that served, in part, as historical motiva-
tion for the Fifth Amendment.
267. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 5 (1996).
268. FED. R. EVID. 501. This most recent version of Rule 501 is the product of the
“restyling” project adopted by congressional inaction in December 2011. According to the
Committee notes, these revisions are “intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to
change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory
committee’s notes to 2011 amendments. Unrestyled Rule 501 provides that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
state law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, gov-
ernment, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accor-
dance with state law.
FED. R. EVID. 501 (1975) (amended 2011).
269. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
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ceived, Rule 501 would have stripped federal courts’ authority to create
evidentiary privileges with the exception of privileges dictated by the
Constitution, such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination.270 At the same time, the Supreme Court recom-
mended that Congress recognize a limited number of evidentiary privi-
leges.271 On that list were a lawyer-client privilege,272 a psychotherapist-
patient privilege,273 a spousal privilege,274 a clergy-penitent privilege,275 a
voting privilege,276 a trade secret privilege,277 a state secret privilege,278
and a privilege protecting the identity of informants in criminal investiga-
tions.279 Congress ultimately declined to adopt most of these recommen-
dations. It did recognize an attorney-client privilege but, under Rule 501
as adopted, left the task of creating and elaborating other evidentiary
privileges to the courts based on “principles of the common law,” “rea-
son,” and “experience.”280
In Trammel v. United States281 and Jaffee v. Redmond,282 the Supreme
Court described how it would exercise the authority granted by Rule 501.
First, the Court weighs the competing interests at stake in recognizing a
privilege.283 In general, this means assessing the social and public value of
a particular relationship284 and the need for confidential communication
to secure those advantages.285 The Court then weighs those benefits
against the costs to truth seeking,286 recognizing a privilege “only to the
very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding rele-
vant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant
270. FED. R. EVID. 501 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972) (“Except as otherwise required by the
Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress, and except as provided
in these rules or in other rules adopted by the Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to:
Refuse to be a witness; or Refuse to disclose any matter; or Refuse to produce any object
or writing; or Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing
any object or writing.”).
271. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47.
272. FED. R. EVID. 503 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
273. FED. R. EVID. 504 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
274. FED. R. EVID. 505 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
275. FED. R. EVID. 506 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
276. FED. R. EVID. 507 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
277. FED. R. EVID. 508 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
278. FED. R. EVID. 509 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
279. FED. R. EVID. 510 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
280. FED. R. EVID. 501.
281. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
282. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
283. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (“Here we must decide whether the privilege against ad-
verse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for
probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice.”).
284. Id. at 48 (noting that the marital privilege “is one affecting marriage, home, and
family relationships—already subject to much erosion in our day . . . .”).
285. Id. at 51 (requiring that privileges must be “rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust.”).
286. Id. at 50 (“Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamen-
tal principle that the public has a right to every man’s evidence.” (citations omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
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principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”287 Second,
the Court looks to state practices, both as a source of “reason” and “ex-
perience” and out of an interest in avoiding conflicts that might frustrate
state law by exposing in federal court the contents of communications
that would be protected in state courts.288 Finally, the Court considers
federal authorities, including the unadopted rules proposed in 1973.
Here, the Court has evinced reluctance to recognize privileges that are
not either well-established in the common law289 or among those enumer-
ated in the unadopted proposed rules.
Jaffee provides a helpful example of how the Court exercises its author-
ity under Rule 501. The question presented there was whether confiden-
tial communications between a patient and a licensed social worker in a
therapeutic setting should be shielded from discovery during civil litiga-
tion.290 Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens found that psy-
chotherapy as a practice produces significant social benefits.291 “The
mental health of our citizenry,” he wrote, “no less than its physical health,
is a public good of transcendent importance.”292 Justice Stevens then
highlighted the critical role that confidentiality plays in psychotherapy. In
contrast to the diagnosis and treatment of “physical ailments,” which
“can often proceed successfully on the basis of a physical examination,
objective information supplied by the patient, and the results of diagnos-
tic tests,” Justice Stevens pointed out that psychotherapists can only ac-
cess the information they need from patient communications.293 As a
consequence, he continued, “psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmos-
phere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a
frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and
fears.”294 At the same time, the nature of those disclosures are often very
personal and “disclosure . . . may cause embarrassment or disgrace.”295
The possibility that disclosures to a psychotherapist might become public
in a court of law, therefore, compromises the entire practice, potentially
denying society the significant benefits of professional mental health
treatment.296 At the same time, Justice Stevens argued, the costs to truth-
seeking from recognizing the privilege would be “modest.”297 That is be-
287. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
288. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996). These concerns are familiar from the
Fourth Amendment context. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221–22. The Court also consults state prac-
tices to assess the contemporary validity of a rule of privilege. See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S.
at 48 (noting that support for the spousal privilege had declined from thirty-two states in
1958 to twenty-four in 1974).
289. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 48 (“[T]he long history of the privilege suggests that it ought
not to be casually cast aside.”).
290. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 20.
291. Id. at 10.
292. Id. at 11.
293. Id. at 10.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 11–12.
297. Id. at 11.
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cause denial of the privilege would chill psychotherapy considerably, ef-
fectively preventing the very disclosures at issue from being made in the
first place.298 Thus, failure to recognize a psychotherapist privilege would
dramatically compromise the benefits of psychotherapy without produc-
ing a substantial benefit to truth-seeking.299
The Jaffee Court also found considerable support for a psychotherapist
privilege in both state and federal law. As Justice Stevens noted, “[A]ll 50
States and the District of Columbia ha[d] enacted into law some form of
psychotherapist privilege . . . .”300 And “[d]enial of the federal privilege
therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state legislation that was
enacted to foster these confidential communications.”301 In addition, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was among the rules proposed by the
Court to Congress in 1973.302 Furthermore, the record of the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee’s deliberations reflect its view that psy-
chotherapy depends on a patient’s “willingness and ability to talk freely,”
which “makes it difficult if not impossible” for psychotherapy to function
without “confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication.”303 This
consensus, the Jaffee Court concluded, “indicates that ‘reason and experi-
ence’ support recognition of the [psychotherapist] privilege.”304
The list of widely recognized evidentiary privileges is short. In addition
to the psychotherapist privilege recognized in Jaffee, the Court has exer-
cised its authority under Rule 501 to protect confidential communications
between spouses.305 Rule 502 protects attorney-client communications.306
There is also considerable support in state and federal courts for a clergy-
penitent privilege307 and a right to confidentiality at the ballot box, which
were among the privileges recognized in the proposed rules. Although
the Supreme Court has been skeptical of a physician-patient privilege,308
confidentiality is a central feature of medical ethics.309 Many states pro-
tect confidential communications with physicians for the purpose of diag-
298. Id. at 11–12.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 12.
301. Id. at 13.
302. Id. at 14.
303. Id. at 10 (quoting Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)).
304. Id. at 13.
305. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980); see also Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 80–82 (1958); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933); Jin Fuey
Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 (1920); Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121
(1893); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839).
306. FED. R. EVID. 502.
307. See, e.g., Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 728–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
308. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (drawing a distinction between the work of physicians
and psychotherapists insofar as “[t]reatment by a physician for physical ailments can often
proceed successfully on the basis of a physical examination, objective information supplied
by the patient, and the results of diagnostic tests”); see also United States v. Bek, 493 F.3d
790, 801 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Federal common law has not historically recognized a privilege
between patients and physicians.”).
309. For example, most physicians take a professional oath that includes some version
of the Hippocratic pledge that “whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profes-
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nosis or treatment.310 Federal law protects the confidentiality of health
information,311 and the Supreme Court has recognized the highly private
nature of health-related information.312 Therefore, there is good reason
to include a physician-patient privilege on the tally of established eviden-
tiary privileges. But that probably caps the list.
So, how might the law of evidentiary privileges support a right to go
dark? Two possibilities come to mind. First, some digital data, electronic
communications, and exchanges with devices may fall within the protec-
tions afforded by established privileges. To the extent this is so, a right to
go dark would guarantee important protections, putting this data on
equal footing with communications between live persons. This seems a
perfectly plausible argument, though limited in terms of its scope. Sec-
ond, we might want to recognize a new privilege that would ground a
more general right to go dark, providing broad protections for a wide
variety of digital data and devices. Here, the case for a common law right
to go dark is on shakier ground. That may well change as our engage-
ments with these technologies expand and evolve. Health-related tech-
nologies provide a nice example for discussion.
There is an increasing number of medical health or “mHealth” apps in
use on smartphones and wearable devices.313 Some of these provide plat-
forms through which users can communicate with healthcare profession-
als. Talkspace is a good example. Talkspace allows customers to
communicate directly and anonymously with licensed mental health pro-
fessionals. Talkspace and similar platforms often have access to the con-
tents of communications between patients and therapists. Some
companies commoditize information gleaned from that content.314 Set-
ting aside this complication, these kinds of apps would otherwise seem to
fit nicely within established privileges such as the psychotherapist privi-
lege or the doctor-patient privilege. It would therefore make good sense
to recognize a right to encrypt those communications, thereby putting
communications through these platforms on the same footing as commu-
sion, as well as outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not
be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets.”
310. Policy of the Privilege, 25 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5522 (1st ed.).
311. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2018).
312. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
313. MHealth apps are “medical and public health practice supported by mobile de-
vices.” WORLD HEALTH ORG., MHEALTH: THE NEW HORIZONS FOR HEALTH THROUGH
MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES 6 (2011), https://www.who.int/goe/publications/goe_mhealth_web
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QJU-DE44]. By 2018, 1.7 billion people (roughly 24% of the
world’s population) worldwide are expected to use mHealth apps on their smartphones. J.
Frazee, M. Finley & JJ Rohack, MHealth and Unregulated Data: Is This Farewell to Patient
Privacy?, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 385, 385 (2016).
314. A 2015 study of mHealth apps found that nearly all apps studied shared informa-
tion with third parties deemed sensitive, and at least 10% shared medical information. See
Jinyan Zang et al., Who Knows What About Me? A Survey of Behind the Scenes Personal
Data Sharing to Third Parties by Mobile Apps, TECH. SCI. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://techsci
ence.org/a/2015103001 [https://perma.cc/8HAM-Q2CV].
660 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
nications during live, in person treatment and therapy.315
By extension, there might also be good grounds for recognizing a lim-
ited right to go dark tailored to apps that diagnose or treat medical or
mental illness. Many mHealth apps are making use of artificial intelli-
gence (AI) to diagnose and treat patients. For example, there is an app
that uses speech pattern analysis to diagnose Parkinson’s disease.316
Wearable sleep monitors, such as Fitbit, can aid in the diagnosis of sleep
disorders. There is a raft of apps that use cognitive behavioral therapy to
treat patients with a wide range of mental diseases, including depression
and drug addiction. One of these, WoeBot, “uses brief daily chat conver-
sations, mood tracking, curated videos, and word games to help people
manage mental health.”317 WoeBot can be prescribed and monitored by a
human therapist, but its creators believe it has the potential to operate
independently. Using AI, Big Data, and taking advantage of constant ac-
cess to its patients, WoeBot and its ilk may well be in a better position to
monitor and treat patients than sadly limited carbon-based providers.
To the extent WoeBot and similar technologies are playing roles once
reserved for human healthcare providers, there is every reason to think
that its communications with its patients should be privileged. If that is
right, then a right to go dark would give full effect to these protections,
putting communications with AI providers on equal footing with those
between meat sacks.
There is also a class of mHealth technologies that monitor, gather, and
analyze biodata such as vital signs, activity levels, and sleep. Sometimes
these apps provide data for human caregivers. For example, there are
apps that work in conjunction with glucose monitors and insulin pumps to
help patients monitor blood sugar levels and insulin dosing. Similarly,
there are apps and devices that monitor heart rate and blood pressure to
help physicians diagnose and treat cardiovascular diseases.318 There are
devices patients swallow to monitor when medication is taken and how
well it is metabolized.319 And there are wearable technologies that moni-
tor eye movements to help diagnose vestibular disorders. Although these
315. One might wonder what value a right to go dark adds if we assume that communi-
cations through apps like Talkspace are covered by existing rules of privilege. The answer
is impenetrability. Incidents of live oral communication are inherently ephemeral absent a
specific effort to make a record. Encrypting digital communications puts them in essen-
tially this same existential posture. Encryption would therefore protect these communica-
tions from unwarranted intrusion while also preserving the same possibilities for lawful
discovery available for oral communications between caregivers and their patients.
316. Melanie Swan, Sensor Mania! The Internet of Things, Wearable Computing, Objec-
tive Metrics, and the Quantified Self 2.0, J. SENSOR & ACTUATOR NETWORKS 217, 226
(2012).
317. Megan Molteni, The Chatbot Therapist Will See You Now, WIRED (June 7, 2017),
https://www.wired.com/2017/06/facebook-messenger-WoeBot-chatbot-therapist/ [https://
perma.cc/4WYT-7CP7].
318. See, e.g., ALIVECOR, https://www.alivecor.com/ [https://perma.cc/UV28-VLCB]
(last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
319. PROTEUS, http://www.proteus.com/evidence/cardiovascular-diseases/ [https://per
ma.cc/7AFA-J3KJ] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
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technologies are clearly used to diagnose and treat physical and mental
diseases, it is not clear that the data they gather falls within the protec-
tions of established evidentiary privileges. That is because there is no
clear act of “communication” in the usual sense.
Evidentiary privileges protect communications. They do not impose a
general bar on testimony by informational fiduciaries320 such as clergy,
psychotherapists, and doctors. That was not always the case for all fiduci-
aries. For example, at common law, the spousal privilege allowed hus-
bands to bar their wives from offering any kind of adverse testimony at a
criminal trial.321 That privilege covered not just communications but all
testimony relating to acts or events she might have observed.322 As the
Court reports in Trammel, this version of the spousal privilege existed at
a time when defendants were barred from testifying on their own
behalves at criminal trials out of concern both for self-incrimination and
intractable unreliability. Insofar as a wife had no legal status separate
from her husband, she too could not testify at a criminal trial where her
husband was a defendant and for the same reasons.
The underlying justification of the spousal privilege has evolved consid-
erably, of course. It is now understood as a way to secure and protect the
sanctity of the marital relationship and the confidentiality of marital com-
munications.323 As a consequence, the extent of its protections has con-
tracted considerably. Most relevant for present purposes is that many
jurisdictions limit the scope of the privilege to confidential communica-
tions only.324 A spouse may therefore be compelled to testify to her ob-
servations of events and any communications that might have occurred in
the presence of a third party because none of this testimony involves the
disclosure of confidential marital communications—just observations and
nonconfidential communications.
The Court has suggested that the doctor-patient privilege follows this
same pattern, protecting communications but not observations.325 Thus,
as the Court implied in Jaffee, a physician might be compelled to testify
about the results of her “physical examination” and “the results of diag-
nostic tests” even as she stays mum about what her patient said in re-
sponse to diagnostic questions.326 Notably, this is not how the privilege is
universally described. In some jurisdictions, the physician-patient privi-
320. The author takes this phrase from Jack Balkin and Kiel Brennan-Marquez. See
generally, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 611 (2015).
321. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
322. Id.
323. Id. (“The modern justification for this privilege against adverse spousal testimony
is its perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship.”);
see also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958) (“[T]he law should not force or
encourage testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or further inflame existing
domestic differences.”).
324. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.
325. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
326. Id.
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lege covers everything a doctor learns in the course of her professional
treatment of a patient.327 But, to the extent it holds, this distinction be-
tween communications and observations complicates the picture consid-
erably when applied to health monitoring devices.
Take, for example, an app designed to help diabetics better control
their blood sugars. Such an app might require that a user actively input
information, such as foods eaten, activities, insulin doses, and sugar levels
taken manually. Insofar as these inputs can be characterized as communi-
cations with a physician, they might be privileged and therefore amenable
to protection under a right to go dark. But we can also imagine an app
that engages in passive, observational data gathering. For example, it
might gather blood sugar and insulin-dose data from an insulin pump,
activity and location data from a wearable device or smartphone, and
event information from an electronic calendar. This kind of passively ac-
quired data would probably be more accurate and complete than a pa-
tient’s subjective reports, providing a treating endocrinologist with a
richer and more nuanced understanding of her patient’s disease and
treatment. But it probably would not qualify for protection under a doc-
tor-patient privilege because it is passively gathered observational data
akin to the physical diagnosis and test results cited by the Court in Jaffee
as beyond the scope of a communication privilege.
Although results from objective medical tests and data gathered pas-
sively by mHealth apps may not be covered by the physician-patient priv-
ilege, there are good grounds for arguing that they should be. Statutory
versions of the physician-patient privilege in many jurisdictions cover
physical diagnosis and test results.328 That lines up nicely with well-estab-
lished privacy protections. Specifically, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and parallel state laws grant considera-
ble rights to privacy and confidentiality in patient records.329 In 2015, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considered the application of
HIPAA to mHealth apps.330
Under the FDA’s recommended guidelines, data generated by apps
and other technologies that act as medical devices would be afforded
HIPAA protection.331 An app acts as a medical device in the view of the
FDA when it transforms a mobile platform into a regulated medical de-
vice, connects to an existing device for purposes of controlling its opera-
327. See, e.g., 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 428.
328. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 992 (West 2007) (including within the definition of
“confidential communication between patient and physician” and “information obtained
by an examination of the patient”).
329. S. 162, 111th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009); Federal Employees Electronic Personal Health
Records Act of 2007, S. 1456, 110th Cong.; MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 4-302 (West
2017).
330. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERS. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDI-
CAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF 4 (2015), https://www.inea.com/PDF/Mobile%20Medical%20Applications%2002
%2009%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBB3-H83W].
331. Id. at 21–26.
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tion, or is used to monitor or analyze patient-specific medical device
data.332 Any app or technology prescribed by a physician to aid in the
diagnosis and treatment of a disease such as our diabetes app would cer-
tainly seem to qualify for protection under these FDA standards. If the
data gathered by these devices is protected by HIPAA, then there may be
good grounds to argue that they should be protected by the doctor-pa-
tient privilege as well. In fact, the digital footprints created by these apps
and devices is often more revealing than the information included in a
traditional medical health record.333 After all, traditional testing in a
clinical setting captures only one dimension of health status at a particu-
lar moment in time. By contrast, these technologies continuously monitor
a person’s habits, generating a wealth of health data that can be far more
revealing.334
But these are all fairly specialized technologies. It may be straightfor-
ward to argue for protecting communications and data associated with
devices that are prescribed or actively monitored by a physician or thera-
pist. But what about the mine-run of mHealth apps deployed and used by
users solely on their own initiative? Wearable devices like Fitbit, Pebbles,
Garmin, and Apple Watch represent an exploding sector of the market
for consumer technologies.335 Linked to smartphones or cloud-based pro-
grams, these devices offer users a way to improve health, fitness, and
wellbeing in a wide variety of ways along many dimensions. There are, of
course, the standard activity, heartrate, and location trackers that allow
users to monitor their exercise sessions and assess daily activity levels.
There are also devices targeted at mental health such as PIP, a monitor
that works with an accompanying app to help users cope with and reduce
stress,336 and Muse, a headband “that [gives] you accurate, real-time
feedback on what’s happening in your brain when you meditate”337 (what
could be more conducive to achieving a state of transcendental conscious-
ness!). These kinds of self-help technologies might contribute incidentally
to the diagnosis and treatment of disease, but they are really designed to
assist users in reaching their own health, fitness, and wellness goals. They
therefore would not seem to fall within the protection of any traditional
privilege. But might these technologies qualify for their own privilege and
thereby provide groundwork for a more general right to go dark? The
332. Id.
333. Jane Sarasohn-Kahn, Here’s Looking at You: How Personal Health Information Is
Being Tracked and Used, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND. (July 11, 2014), https://www.chcf
.org/publication/heres-looking-at-you-how-personal-health-information-is-being-tracked-
and-used/ [https://perma.cc/4P8S-7JWB].
334. See Frazee, Finley & Rohack, supra note 313, at 396.
335. Paul Lamkin, Wearable Tech Market to Be Worth $34 Billion by 2020, FORBES
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/paullamkin/2016/02/17/wearable-tech-market-
to-be-worth-34-billion-by-2020/#7951b55d3cb5 [https://perma.cc/3L2J-ZKH4].
336. PIP, https://thepip.com/en-us/ [https://perma.cc/98BR-RSTW] (last visited Oct. 12,
2019).
337. MUSE, https://choosemuse.com/blog/40-days-of-meditation-with-muse-a-journey/
[https://perma.cc/H6K2-EYG2] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
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best way to answer that question is to follow the analytic course charted
by the Court in Trammel and Jaffee.
There can be little doubt that users’ relationships with mHealth apps
have significant social and public value. As the Court recognized in Jaf-
fee, the physical and mental health “of our citizenry . . . is a public good of
transcendent importance.”338 The Centers for Disease Control estimates
that there were nearly 200,000 preventable deaths in 2014 attributed to
heart disease, cancer, respiratory disease, and cardiovascular disease.339
Researchers estimate that tens of thousands of these deaths could be pre-
vented by lifestyle changes.340 In addition to mortality, there are signifi-
cant morbidity and treatment costs associated with diseases linked in part
to lifestyle.341 For example, treatment of Type 2 diabetes can exceed
$100,000 over the lifetime of a patient,342 and the American Diabetes
Foundation estimates that the total costs of morbidity and treatment of
Type 2 diabetes and prediabetes in the United States exceeds $322 billion
each year.343 Given these numbers, there can be little doubt that mHealth
devices designed to prevent, treat, and manage diseases by affecting lifes-
tyle have tremendous potential value for society.344
338. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
339. Macarena C. Garcı´a et al., Potentially Preventable Deaths Among the Five Leading
Causes of Death—United States, 2010 and 2014, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 1245, 1247 (2016).
340. Alice Park, Nearly Half of US Deaths Can be Prevented with Lifestyle Changes,
TIME (May 1, 2014), http://time.com/84514/nearly-half-of-us-deaths-can-be-prevented-
with-lifestyle-changes/ [https://perma.cc/8EKG-TZKN].
341. Fatma Al-Maskari, Lifestyle Diseases: An Economic Burden on the Health Ser-
vices, XLVII UN CHRONICLE 2 (2010), https://unchronicle.un.org/article/lifestyle-diseases-
economic-burden-health-services [https://perma.cc/T9J6-ZSU7].
342. Xiaohui Zhuo et al., Lifetime Direct Medical Costs of Treating Type 2 Diabetes and
Diabetic Complications, 45 AM. J. PREV. MED. 253, 257 (2013).
343. AMERICAN DIABETES ASS’N, http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-basics/statistics/info
graphics/adv-staggering-cost-of-diabetes.html [https://perma.cc/R4QG-NKMG] (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2019).
344. See, e.g., Lisa A. Cadmus-Bertram et al., Randomized Trial of Fitbit-Based Physi-
cal Activity Intervention for Women, 49 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 414, 414 (2015) (“The
Fitbit was well accepted in this sample of women and associated with increased physical
activity at 16 weeks. Leveraging direct-to-consumer mHealth technologies aligned with be-
havior change theories can strengthen physical activity interventions.”); Deborah F. Tate,
Elizabeth J. Lyons & Carmina G. Valle, High-Tech Tools for Exercise Motivation: Use and
Role of Technologies Such as the Internet, Mobile Applications, Social Media, and Video
Games, 28 DIABETES SPECTRUM 45, 46 (2015) (finding that technology designed to pro-
mote exercise can have positive health effects in patients with type-2 diabetes). As a bit of
field research for this article, the author acquired and deployed a health monitoring device
on his person. The results were positive. The author began to exercise more consistently.
During the eighteen-month study period, he completed two half marathons, two sprint-
distance triathlons, an Olympic-distance triathlon, and several 5k races. Prior to the experi-
ment, he had never run more than a couple of miles and had difficulty swimming fifty
continuous yards. His resting heart rate has slowed from the sixties or seventies to the high
forties. His VO2 Max has improved from forty to fifty-six—whatever that means. He has
lost fourteen pounds and his body composition has improved by 3% to 4% percent. His
LDL cholesterol has gone down substantially as have his triglyceride levels. Over the same
period, his HDL cholesterol has gone up, resulting in an improvement in the ratios used to
assess risk of major cardiovascular events. Moreover, it has been the author’s experience
that the ability to track health and performance data is a significant motivator to exercise.
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But do we need to preserve the confidentiality of communications with
mHealth devices in order to gain these benefits? Confidentiality, for pur-
poses of common law privileges, is usually regarded as necessary if honest
communication is essential to achieve the desired goals of a communica-
tive relationship, and participants are unlikely to be open and honest if
they fear revelation. It seems pretty clear that mHealth devices like Fitbit
would not generate the health and wellness benefits they promise if they
did not have access to accurate information. Lying to or tricking a Fitbit
does not do anyone any good. Similarly, these devices are more likely to
provide more benefits the more they have access to us and our activities.
These technologies hold the most promise for improving health and well-
ness if they are part of an informational ecosystem that tracks daily activ-
ity, exercise, sleep, food and beverage intake, stress levels, social
engagement, etc. To fulfill their potential then, we need to communicate
openly and honestly with these technologies. But would that open and
honest communication be compromised by the threat of revelation in a
court of law?
The nature of the information we share with mHealth technologies is
bound to be intimate, private, and revealing. Directly and inferentially,
these technologies know our daily habits, when we have sex, with whom,
when we menstruate, our institutional affiliations, and our personal and
professional associations, not to mention details about body composition.
In many ways, gaining access to these devices is akin to gaining access to
our inner selves and our most private moments. Given the nature and
extent of this information sharing, one might well expect that the threat
of revelation would decrease the likelihood of open and honest communi-
cation with mHealth devices. Speaking for himself, it is one of the princi-
pal reasons the author was reluctant to wear or use them.345 But the
author appears to be in a minority. The raw truth is that these devices are
already in widespread use and the market is growing.346 At the same
time, many users readily share information gathered by these devices
with others, including online communities, in order to gain the additional
benefits of training advice or community support.347 Moreover, there is
good evidence that this sharing actually enhances the likelihood of
achieving sustained benefits by providing motivation and accountabil-
ity.348 On the other hand, it may well be the case that more people would
Of course, this is anecdata based on an n of one, but it supports the promise of these
devices to promote health.
345. The author overcame this reluctance for the good of science. See supra note 344.
As with most electronic devices, fitness trackers have privacy settings that can be adjusted
by the user. The author locked his down but remains skeptical of the actual protections
afforded by the privacy settings.
346. Sarah Perez, IDC: Apple Led Wearables Market in 2018, With 46.2M of the Total
172.2M Devices Shipped, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 5, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/05/
idc-apple-led-wearables-market-in-2018-with-46-2m-of-the-total-172-2m-devices-shipped/
[https://perma.cc/96WG-2F4H].
347. Examples include Garmin Connect, Strava, and iFit.
348. See Mark Lemstra et al., Weight Loss Intervention Adherence and Factors Promot-
ing Adherence: A Meta-Analysis, 10 PATIENT PREFERENCE & ADHERENCE 1547, 1547
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be more likely to use mHealth devices if they were private and secure. So,
offering the protections of privilege might expand the universe of users,
thereby increasing social utility. And, of course, any user of mHealth de-
vices would always be free to waive that privilege in order to access addi-
tional services.
The last factor to consider is legal precedent in state law or federal
statute. Here, the record is thin. Predictably, a personal electronic device
privilege was not on the list presented to Congress in 1973. To date, at
least, there is no state authority directly on point. The most relevant
source of “reason” and “experience” may therefore be the FDA frame-
work outlined above. Under those guidelines, the records generated by
personal technologies would be protected under HIPAA only if they
were acting as a medical device. Although technologies aimed at enhanc-
ing health and wellness might credibly be described as advancing medical
interests, it seems a stretch to categorize them as medical devices akin to
insulin pumps and echocardiographs.
In sum, there seems to be a good case for a limited right to go dark for
some devices based on existing privileges such as the psychotherapist-
patient and doctor-patient privileges. That is particularly true where the
device acts as a conduit for communications between patients and
caregivers. There is also a reasonable case to be made that monitoring
devices prescribed by a physician or therapist in order to gather sensitive
data for purposes of diagnosis or treatment would also be subject to a
claim of privilege by reference to existing FDA standards. By contrast,
there does not seem to be good grounds for a general right to go dark
when it comes to personal electronic devices adopted by users on their
own initiative. But that may well change.
Under the framework developed by the Court in its Rule 501 jurispru-
dence, much turns on the nature of the communications, social utility,
and the importance of confidentiality. As we saw in our analysis of the
Fifth Amendment, the trend is clearly in the direction of more integration
between carbon and silicon systems. It is hard to imagine at this stage the
cultural shifts that these technological developments might bring with
them. In ten years, it may be obvious that information shared with per-
sonal electronic devices must be privileged in order to garner critical so-
cial benefits. But if that is the future, then we have not yet arrived.
There is one more possibility worth our consideration. Recall that one
justification for the spousal privilege under the common law was the pro-
position that a wife had no legal status independent of her husband. As a
consequence, compelling a wife to testify against her husband was
equivalent to compelling him to testify against himself. Although aban-
doned in the context of the law of spousal privilege, that insight might
add dimension to a right to go dark grounded in evidentiary privileges
just as it did in the Fifth Amendment context. Given our relationships
(2016) (finding that exercise “interventions that offered social support had higher adher-
ence than those without social support”).
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with many of our personal devices and the degrees of access they have to
our lives, it is not a stretch to say that they are extensions of ourselves.349
To the extent this is so, perhaps our devices should qualify for a version of
the old common law spousal privilege. Recognizing a right to go dark
would guarantee our authority to determine whether our devices can tes-
tify against us. If that were the law, then a derivative right to go dark
would guarantee that nothing our devices know as a consequence of be-
ing our devices could ever be used against us unless we affirmatively
waived.
V. CONCLUSION
New and emerging technologies invite all of us to be futurists. It is hard
to know the nature of what is to come. What is certain is that these tech-
nologies are bound to compel changes in the law necessary to accommo-
date the new and important roles they will play in our lives. One question
we will need to answer at some point is whether and to what degree we
will have the right to secure the data, information, and communications
gathered by, lodged on, and conducted through personal technologies
like smartphones and wearable devices. The Supreme Court has already
held that accessing this kind of information is a search that requires a
warrant. But is that enough? In addition to the procedural protections
afforded by a warrant requirement, should we also enjoy a right to go
dark, effectively preventing all access to our data and communications
absent our consent? Although this article has not offered a definitive an-
swer to this question, it has provided a framework for assessing where we
are in the hope that it will be helpful in charting a course for where we
might go in the future.
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